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ABSTRACT
A Comparison of the Usability of Security Mechanisms Provided by iOS and
Android
David Maulick
The Open Web Application Security Project identifies that the number one vulnera-
bility in mobile applications is the misuse of platform-provided security mechanisms.
This means that platforms like iOS and Android, which now account for 99.8% of the
mobile phone market, are providing mechanisms that are consistently being used in
an incorrect manner. This statistic shines a spotlight onto both platforms. Why is it
that so many people are misusing platform provided security mechanisms? And is it
the platforms fault? The supposition of this paper is that both iOS and Android are
not creating usable security mechanisms.
This paper is meant to be a direct response to the number one spot on the OWASP
Top Ten Mobile Vulnerabilities list. As a result, our primary goal is to identify
whether or not iOS and Android are creating usable security mechanisms. To do this
we first proposed an evaluation framework that is tailored to evaluate the usability
of mobile device security mechanisms. Then we used it to evaluate seven of the most
important and therefore most popular security mechanisms provided by iOS and
Android. Through this evaluation we not only hope to develop a clear landscape of
overall mobile security mechanism usability, but we also hope to compare the usability
across the two platforms.
Overall, it was found that both platforms adequately supported the more popular
security mechanisms like key storage and HTTPS. Whereas support for some of the
more low-level mechanisms, like encryption and MACs, were often neglected. Such
neglect could be seen in a number of different ways; however, the most common neglect
came in the form of old documentation, or APIs that are long over do for a rebuild
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or increased abstraction. Furthermore, both platforms barely addressed the testing
of implementations, despite the fact that testing is arguably the most important part
of the software development cycle. Both iOS and Android seldom gave the developer
any guidance on verifying the functionality of their implementations.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Each year cyber exploits are becoming more consistent, in fact from 2015 to 2017
the number of recorded data breaches have more than doubled [1]. It is common
knowledge that hackers have been attempting to exploit desktop operating systems
and add-on software for years. Therefore, there has been a lot of effort put into
securing such devices. But it is 2018 and 95% of Americans own a cellphone of
some kind, and 77% of Americans own smartphones [2]. With this emergence of
smartphone popularity comes new and often more severe security threats than ever
before. Our smartphones are essentially handheld computers. But unlike our laptops
and desktops, we bring our smartphones everywhere we go, and almost never turn
them off.
From a networking perspective, these mobile computers are now continuously
operating on unknown and often insecure networks that an attacker could be set up
on. On top of this, simply bringing our phones with us everywhere we go increases
the probability of getting it stolen or losing it. In fact, in 2013 alone it was reported
that 4.5 million phones were lost or stolen. In both scenarios it is plain to see that
mobile phones are not just the easier target for hackers, but the smarter target. This
especially shows true when one considers that mobile devices are being used to handle
an individual’s most sensitive data. According to the U.S. Federal Reserve, all the
way back in 2014, 40% of mobile phone owners with bank accounts were already using
mobile banking apps [3]. Using mobile devices as the primary target of an attack is
not just the low risk option, it is also showing to be a high reward attack vector.
As shown in the facts of the previous paragraphs, there is an enormous need for
continuous improvement in mobile security. OWASP, the Open Web Application
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Security Project [4], is one entity that is leading the charge on such defense. OWASP
is an open source community that has a very strong reputation for its contribution
to the secure software community. In regards to mobile, they are most prominently
known for their OWASP Top 10 Mobile Vulnerabilities List. They release this list
every two years; this paper will be referring to the 2016 installment of the list as the
2018 list has yet to be released. This list is a fantastic representation of the most
common vulnerabilities in mobile security, and should be thought of as a centralized
resource intended to give developers and security teams the resources they need to
build and maintain secure mobile applications [5].
The number one spot on the OWASP top -10 list is an essential building block
of this paper; it is Improper platform usage. Its description identifies that the most
common reason for vulnerable mobile apps is that developers are implementing secu-
rity mechanisms incorrectly. For example, it mentioned that developers often misuse
keychain in iOS, or use insecure permissions on Android [4], thereby rendering their
app insecure. The placement of this vulnerability as the number one place on the
OWASP top 10 list brings the spotlight directly onto the platforms creating these
security mechanisms. The main question that comes to mind is: why is it that such a
large number of developers consistently implement incorrect solutions for a platform
provided mechanisms/API?
The supposition of this paper is that the platforms are not creating security mech-
anisms that are easy for the developer to use. This means that platforms are not
creating security mechanisms that are easy for the developer to use. In fact, judging
by OWASPs number one spot, it appears platform provided security mechanisms are
quite difficult to implement correctly.
This paper seeks to investigate the previously stated supposition through a com-
prehensive usability evaluation on platform provided security mechanisms. To do this,
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the paper will evaluate security mechanisms associated with three other common
vulnerabilities on the OWASP top 10 list: Insecure Data Storage, Insecure Com-
munication, and Insecure Authentication. To do this, the paper will first propose
an evaluation framework that will be used to evaluate the usability of a platform
provided security mechanism. Then it will use the proposed framework to evaluate
the usability of 6 security mechanisms associated with the above identified security
vulnerabilities.
This papers evaluation framework is inspired by a framework proposed in a pre-
vious iteration of this work. The original framework can be found in Florian Steins
paper: A framework for the evaluation of Mobile Platform Support for Implementing
Security Mechanisms [6]. While this papers evaluation framework will be different
than Steins it will remain comparable. The goal of changing the framework in this
paper is to simplify Steins framework into fewer, more simplified fields of evaluation.
By doing this we hope the subcategories of the evaluation become more meaningful
to the reader. However, we are careful to not change too much about the framework
because another goal of this paper is to further legitimize the framework through con-
stant results between this paper and the prior. In order to do this the methodology
must remain at its core, similar to the original iteration.
The primary goal of this work is to yield evaluation results that provide insight
into how usable the security mechanisms provided by iOS and Android are. The
evaluation results are not meant to be a comparison of which platform is better or
worse, rather a comparison of how usable they are. Secondly, we hope to contribute to
the field of API usability by proposing a robust evaluation framework to assess security
mechanisms. Finally, this paper is meant to be an extension of OWASPs mission to
enable developers to be more aware and better prepared to create secure mobile
applications. Therefore, this paper is meant to add to the open source community,
and serve as a useful resource to the average iOS and Android developer seeking to
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implement common security mechanisms properly.
In order to focus the scope of this paper, we will be narrowing our efforts on the two
largest mobile device platforms: iOS and Android. The mobile device market share
has been monopolized by these two platforms [7], therefore it makes sense to limit the
evaluation to these two platforms. For iOS we will be evaluating iOS 11; on Android
we will be evaluating Oreo. Evaluating iOS 11 makes sense because despite its recent
release, 52% of iPhone users have already adopted it [8]. The software generation
decision for Android was more convoluted because there is such a wide variation in
current Android software. However, Android Oreo was ultimately chosen because it
is the most recently deployed and relates to the most up-to-date documentation from
Google.
It is important to mention that this paper is not without its weak spots. Likely
the biggest issue is that assessing the usability of an API is difficult to quantify
and therefore subjective in nature. As a result the ideal way to measure usability
would be through survey to get the perspective of many programmers. However, this
approach was not realistic for this iteration because of time constraints, and the fact
that a survey of this kind would require programmers familiar with iOS and Android.
Cal Poly only offers an iOS class currently so finding an adequate survey group was
unlikely. Recognizing this flaw in the evaluation is important. However, as stated one
of the goals of this paper is to further legitimize Steins evaluation approach. Stein
had three people use his framework to evaluate the security mechanisms in his paper.
By building on from his framework, another iteration of evaluation that yields similar
results will bolster the legitimacy of the framework. Further, discrepancy between
the results will highlight potential issues with the framework. Also, in this paper
there is one major assumption. We are assuming that iOS and Android have released
security mechanisms that are in inherently secure when configured correctly.
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In the remainder of this paper we will carry out the research necessary to identify
how well iOS and Android support the developer in correct implementation of their
provided security mechanisms. First the paper will identify the security mechanisms
that will be evaluated in this paper. Then it will outline the framework that will be
used to evaluate each security mechanism outlined. Once this is done, the evaluation
of each security mechanism will be carried out.
Overall, it was found that both platforms adequately supported the more popular
security mechanisms like key storage and HTTPS. Whereas support for some of the
more low-level mechanisms, like encryption and MACs, were often neglected. Such
neglect could be seen in a number of different ways; however, the most common neglect
came in the form of old documentation, or APIs that are long over do for a rebuild
or increased abstraction. Furthermore, both platforms barely addressed the testing
of implementations, despite the fact that testing is arguably the most important part
of the software development cycle. Both iOS and Android seldom gave the developer
any guidance on verifying the functionality of their implementations.
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Chapter 2
RELATED WORKS
In our background research it was no surprise that (mobile) security in general has
been researched quite in depth. However there is only one related work found that
shared the same goal as this paper: Florian Steins A Framework for the Evaluation
of Mobile Platform Support for Implementing Security Mechanisms [6]. Steins paper
primarily seeked to propose an evaluation framework for evaluating the usability of
mobile security mechanisms. But in order test out its feasibility, the framework was
used to evaluate a number of security mechanisms.
The inspiration for our paper is in direct relation to the OWASP top mobile
vulnerability lists number one spot, improper platform usage[9]. It identified the fact
that the number one issue in mobile security is the lack of usability in mobile platform
APIs[10]. OWASP identified that such APIs include anything from non-security APIs
to complex security mechanisms. We used this issue as a traction point that would
allow us to identify that usability of security APIs are an issue.
Because the primary focus of this paper is on the usability of security mechanisms.
The OWASP top ten list was further used to narrow our scope of which security
APIs to evaluate the usability of in this paper. We decided to evaluate the usability
of security mechanisms associated with the number two, three and four spot on the
OWASP mobile vulnerabilities top ten list.
Because this papers primary goal is to evaluate the usability of mobile security
mechanisms, usability evaluation techniques were the primary field of research prior
to the start of the experimentation. As Stein stated: being the single author of this
work carries with a it a higher likelihood of error, subjectivity and lack of statisti-
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cal relevance. Therefore it was deemed worthwhile to research alternate evaluation
approaches. Through research there were three usability evaluation approaches iden-
tified:
1. Surveys
2. Automated Evaluation
3. Cognitive dimension framework
Each of the above options had its strengths and weaknesses. In Steins paper it was
identified that the evaluation of usability by one person is in nature a subjective eval-
uation. Therefore survey was a usability evaluation technique that emerged as likely
the most objective and effective technique. However usability evaluation through sur-
vey was quickly debunked because of lack of resources and time constraints. In order
to carry out an adequate survey evaluation of usability of mobile security mechanisms
it is required to have a participant pool that is familiar with both iOS and Android.
This was a major constraint at Cal poly because there is only an iOS class at Cal
Poly. Further, actually getting this class to participate would be a challenge in itself
that required more preparation.
The second evaluation option that was considered is an automated approach. In
other words the evaluation could have been a set of programs that would evaluate the
different categories of the framework from a more quantitative perspective. An ex-
ample of such a program would be counting the number of functions associated with
a certain mechanism to indicate difficulty of implementation. This approach would
have been ideal from a speed of execution point of view. However this approach was
also quickly debunked. Such an approach lacks the descriptiveness necessary for a
usability evaluation. Usability in nature is subjective and therefore its evaluation
must maintain components of subjectiveness in order to be adequately informative.
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As a result a purely quantitative evaluation would be insufficient. A sufficient pro-
grammatic approach would require machine learning and/or NLP to account for the
many qualitative aspects of usability; this approach however would stand alone as its
own thesis.
Like Stein, the final decision was to use a cognitive dimensions framework. The
cognitive dimensions framework was first introduced by Thomas Green (University
of Leeds) in 1989/1991 and further detailed by Green and Marian Petre a few years
later[11]. The paper identified the subjective nature of evaluating usability, so it
designed the cognitive dimensions framework to act as a lightweight approach to
analyze quality of design or usability.
While this paper ultimately decides to build upon Steins cognitive framework
approach for evaluating usability of security mechanisms. Steins framework had a
number of pitfalls that this paper seeks to address and improve upon. For example,
at times Steins evaluation seemed redundant as it would evaluate subcategories that
overlapped. For example, its evaluation of documentation measured the structure
and awareness of platform provided documentation. Structure measured how well
linked the pages were, while awareness measured how well the pages mentioned other
important documents. It was identified that these two fields were greatly similar
and could actually be combined into one evaluation. Further there were certain
fields that were too difficult to evaluate effectively to bring meaningful results to the
study. As a result this paper attempts to maintain a majority of Steins approach, but
also attempts to simplify it into a more compact and easy to follow framework. In
each effort to simplify, the cognitive dimensions framework[11] was heavily consulted
in order to maintain the original foundations proposed in the original proposal of
the cognitive dimensions framework. Such decisions are further discussed in the
implementation section where the criteria of the evaluation of described in depth.
8
The overall structure of the usability evaluation was created in relation to the
software development life cycle (SDLC)[12]. In order to evaluate the usability of
platform provided mechanisms we had to evaluate where in the software development
cycle the developer building the mechanism would likely expect help from the platform
that built the mechanism. It was identified that there were three main parts where
the platform would be able to assist the developer in their creation of the mechanisms.
First, when the developer first begins learning about the mechanism, they will require
useful and succinct documentation to help them understand the workings of the
mechanism. Second, did the platform provide a mechanism that is easy for the
developer to use. In other words did the platform create a well designed API. And
finally, does the platform help the developer test their implementation. As a result it
was identified that our evaluation framework should evaluate the platforms support
on how well the documented the API is, how easy it is to implement, and whether it
assists in testing the mechanism.
Lastly, one vice of Steins paper was that it often used terms like security mech-
anism and platform in a vague manner. In this part of the related works the goal is
to clear up any obscurity by directly defining how we mean certain terms. Although
some of these terms may seem obvious to some readers, each terms use in this paper
is vital to the clarity of argumentation. Therefore we are taking this precaution to
overwrite any preconceived definitions of the terms.
1. Security vulnerability is a category of security that has been identified as an
attack vector for a hacker. Typically will be referring to a vulnerability identified
by the OWASP top ten Mobile vulnerability list [9]
2. A Platform is the operating system of a given mobile device. This paper will be
evaluating security mechanisms created by Apple and Google. Apples platform
is iOS and Googles platform is Android.
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3. A Security mechanism is a cover term for any defense against a Security vul-
nerability. A security mechanism could be any sort of API, feature or control
that is used to defend against a given security vulnerability. Note that security
mechanism, counter mechanism, counter mechanism API and security API are
equivalent in the context of this paper.
10
Chapter 3
METHODOLOGY
This section is broken up into two main parts. In the first section we will identify the
security mechanisms that this paper will be evaluating the usability of. Then in the
second section we will propose the evaluation framework being used in this paper.
Table 3.1: Summary of Chosen Security Mechanisms and Vulnerabilities
Idenifier Security Mechanism
Insecure Data Storage
M-SD-1 Encryption
M-SD-2 MAC
M-SD-3 Key Storage
Insecure Communication
M-SD-1 HTTPS
M-SD-2 Certificate Pinning
Insecure Authentication
M-SD-1 Device Credential Authentication
3.1 Introduction to Selected Security Mechanisms
Because the purpose of this paper is so heavily based on the number one vulnera-
bility (improper platform usage) from the OWASP top ten Vulnerabilities list[13], it
seemed natural to evaluate security mechanisms that defended against the other ma-
jor vulnerabilities identified by OWASP. As a result, this paper will be evaluating the
usability security mechanisms that are commonly used to counter that of OWASPs
second, third, and fourth biggest vulnerabilities in mobile. These vulnerabilities are
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insecure data storage, insecure communication, and insecure authentication respec-
tively. In table 3.1, we identify the security mechanisms that we will be evaluating
in this paper paired with their respective security vulnerability. The remainder of
this section is simply meant to be an introduction to each mechanism covered in this
study. If the reader is familiar with these security mechanisms they should feel free
to skip this section.
3.1.1 Insecure Data Storage
The number two spot on the OWASP top ten Mobile Vulnerabilities list is insecure
data Storage. The section refers to any form of data storage that can be considered
insecure, or even unintended data leakage. This paper will assess the usability of
three primary security mechanisms that are often used in the secure storage of data:
encryption, MACs and key storage.
The first security mechanism evaluated in defense against insecure data storage
is encryption. Encryptions purpose is to maintain confidentiality, it does not ensure
integrity or authenticity of use. The only purpose of encryption is to scramble the
original piece of data or message so that only personnel that have access to the key
can access the true meaning of the scrambled data. To maintain confidentiality,
encryption encodes a message in such a way that only authorized parties can access
it, and those who are not authorized cannot [14].
Without encryption, an adversary would be able to steal all of the information on
a users device simply by imaging it on their desktop. Prior to the iOS 8 release, an
iPhone was insufficiently encrypted [15][16]. Likewise, until 2014, Android by default
stored data on disk in plain text and did not require manufacturers to encrypt data
[16]. Back then if an adversary got physical access to any iPhone or android phone,
all they had to do was plug it into a computer and they would instantly have access
12
to all of your personal information.
Nowadays iOS and Android encrypt all of the data associated with their products.
However, it is still the responsibility of third party apps to correctly encrypt their
user data, and as shown by OWASP, correct encryption is still an issue. Further, An
Empirical Study of the Cryptographic Misuse in Android Applications, by Manual
Egele and David Brumley, solidifies the lack of effective cryptography use in the
Google play store. They identified that 10,327 out of 11,748 in the google play store
that use cryptography make at least one error in their implementation [17].
It is also worth mentioning that encryption comes in a number of different forms.
Encryption algorithms can use asymmetric keys, where there are two keys but just
one is kept private. There are also symmetric algorithms that use 1 single private key.
There are also different types of encryption algorithms that can be used as well as
varying modes of operation depending on the type of algorithm. Certain configura-
tions have been cracked recently rendering them insecure, yet Android and iOS both
still support many insecure algorithms, for example DES. And if one implements one
of these insecure algorithms neither platform will stop the developer. These variations
will be further discussed in a later section. But ultimately the paper is concerned
with the security mechanisms provided by iOS and Android to implement any of these
encryption schemes securely.
While encryption is concerned with maintaining the confidentiality of data, MACs
are concerned with maintaining the integrity of data and its authentication. As a
result, the MAC is our second security mechanism covered in this section. There are
a number of MAC algorithms and each are intended to be used as a tool to verify
that a given message has not been tampered with by a third party. Some common
types of MACs include the NMAC, CMAC, and PMAC. But most popularly used,
and likewise the type of MAC typically implemented by iOS and Android, is the
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HMAC. As a result the usability of APIs concerning HMACs will be the what we will
be focusing on.
An HMAC is essentially a keyed cryptographic hash function. A hash function
calculates a fixed-size bit string (a hash, also referred to as digest) from a piece of
data often referred to as a message[18]. If the message has been altered in any way
while in storage or transit, the hash of this altered message will be different than the
original hash; and will thereby identify that the message has been altered[18]. MAC
algorithms are typically used instead of cryptographic hash functions because they
provide a layer of authentication on top of the integrity verification provided by hash
functions.
HMACs authenticate and verify integrity because it makes use of a shared private
key. It is used under the assumption that only those with approved access have the
key. As a result HMACs are able to not only verify that the data has not changed,
it also verifies that the data is coming from the person one expects it to be coming
from. If either the private key or the message vary; the MAC will be different and will
identify that the data has been tampered with. While a cryptographic hash function
does a great job of tracking integrity for an instance like randomized bit flips, MACs
are absolutely necessary to track deliberate alteration of data where an attacker may
have attempted to hide their changes.
One may notice that encryption and MACs have a common vulnerability between
them. Both of their security is only sufficient if their associated private keys are not
accessible by the attacker. If the attacker is somehow able to attain the keys they will
easily be able to see and alter any data on the device. Therefore, secure key storage
is a truly vital part of securely storing any data.
Key storage is a vital component of secure data storage when one realizes how
many keys must be protected in order to maintain secure but also efficient experience
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on a given mobile device. As a result, Key Storage is the third security mechanism
evaluated in this section. A computer does not only need to store keys associated with
MACs and encrypted data, computers must also store keys associated with random
accounts or passwords. The Android keystore and iOSs keychain are the typical tools
used to allow for this extra layer of security. To bolster this both Android and iOS
have developed dedicated hardware to work in unison with these keystores to even
further bolster the security of the device.
3.1.2 Insecure Communication
The third most common mobile vulnerability is insecure communication. This vul-
nerability corresponds to any insecurity associated with getting data from point A to
point B. The usual risks include, but are not limited to data integrity, data confiden-
tiality and origin integrity [19]. If in transit data can be changed without detection
by the receiver this is a major risk. If an attacker can somehow eavesdrop on the
communication between point A and B this is another risk associated with the vul-
nerability. This category also includes oﬄine attacks where an attacker could record
communication and then break it later with third party tools.
In this paper we will approach secure communication from the point of view of
a client mobile app that is a part of a client-server architecture. This will allow us
to more effectively delve into specific portions of the libraries associated with secure
communication. Likewise, this is the approach that Stein took, so by maintaining the
previous approach our results will be directly comparable.
The secure socket layer (SSL) protocol was originally created by Netscape as
SSLv2 in 1994, where it was created to support a secure commerce platform that
would operate over the wire[20]. Since then SSL has proven to be a vitally important
technique in secure communication. As a result it has since been iteratively fixed up,
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patched and re-designed into newer more secure versions, eventually being renamed
as Transport layer security (TLS) protocol, hence the confusion between SSL and
TLS.
The reason SSL/TLS is so important to this section is that if the entire process
of TLS is implemented correctly, from the certificate chain of trust to the public
key exchange to the private key encryption; secure communication can be considered
highly likely.
Hypertext transfer protocol is the underlying protocol used by the internet to
transfer web data across the network. Its use has been the standard for years, how-
ever all traffic associated with HTTP is clear text. This leaves all information sent
over HTTP wide open for attackers to eavesdrop on. In order to protect against
this vulnerability, HTTPS was created to protect web traffic. This was done by im-
plementing SSL/TLS with HTTP, effectively encapsulating the clear text data into
an encrypted format. As a result HTTPS is the first security mechanism that is
evaluated in this section.
The certificate chain of trust is another vitally important component of SSL/TLS
implementation. The certificate chain of trust is essentially what verifies that a given
entity one is trying to communicate with is who they say they are. The explanation for
how certificates verify connections is one that is overly complicated for explanation in
this paper. But the important part to understand is that the integrity of a certificate
that is verifying an SSL/TLS connection is absolutely vital. If the certificate is created
by an attacker the entire connection will be compromised.
The certificates that ones app will inherently trust are a set of over a hundred
certificates located on the OS. The second vulnerability evaluated in this section is
Certificate Pinning, and it is implemented in direct response to the lack of trust to-
wards the certificates that are inherently trusted by the OS. Many app developers
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have moved to using this mechanism so that their app will only trust one or two cer-
tificates that they are in control of. In implementing certificate pinning, the developer
can hard code the certificates they trust into their application. This is a somewhat
advanced mechanism, but it has proven to be very effective.
3.1.3 Insecure Authentication
The only security mechanism being evaluated in this section is the use of local device
credential authentication. OWASP identifies that many apps carry issues concerning
authentication of their users. This includes cases like failing to identify the user at all,
failure to maintain user identify of the user, and plain incorrect user authentication.
As a result, we chose to evaluate passcode and biometric verification. These are two
mechanisms primarily supported by the platform. But it is suggested that developers
building third party apps also make use of such authentication.
3.2 The Evaluation Framework
The evaluation framework that we are proposing is meant to evaluate how well iOS
and Android support the average developer in implementing security mechanisms. As
a result it was designed in a manner that would reflect the typical software develop-
ment cycle. In this way its evaluation is broken up into three main parts and these
parts are outlined in the remainder of this section. The first part will evaluate the
documentation that the platform provides. The second section will evaluate how us-
able the actual mechanism is. And the final section will assess how well the platform
supports the developer in testing the mechanism.
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3.2.1 Documentation
When developers wish to leverage a new feature supported by the native platform,
they will often look to the documentation as a starting point. The official documen-
tation is typically where one will go to achieve this step. Therefore, this first section
of the framework evaluates how useful the security mechanism documentation pro-
vided by the two major platforms, iOS and Android, are. Because this work aims to
measure iOS and Android support, the only documentation being considered is that
which is provided by the platform. No third party information is considered; e.g..
stack overflow, etc. This is because the use of third party support sites often promote
incorrect direction and insecure code as result of their lack of expert review[21].
Both iOS and Android have two, of what we refer to as, document databases
that we will consider valid support pages. First, both iOS and Android have a more
modern developers guide[22][23] that we refer to as the platforms primary database.
The documents in the developer guides are typically up-to-date and almost always
contain actual direction in implementing code. As a result, documents from the
primary database are almost always prefered in this study. Both also have what we
refer to as a secondary database. This database contains numerous original guides and
documentation that iOS and Android were originally built on. For iOS, we refer to
this as their legacy database[24]; it is the primary resource for platform information
that typically explains the underlying functionality of Mac OS and iOS. As a result
most of the information is old, and written in C and Objective-C. Androids secondary
database is Java docs. Android is built from Java and as a result a lot of its low-level
libraries, like the cryptography libraries still refer to the original Java documentation.
In order to assess the documentation provided by a platform, we will take a gener-
alized approach to compare each platforms documentation. This generalized approach
will evaluate each platforms documentation on three categories of evaluation: cover-
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age, structure, and solution. The details of each of these subcategories are outlined
in the remainder of this section.
The first subcategory, coverage, evaluates each platforms documentation on whether
or not all of the necessary information for a given security mechanism is available to
the programmer. In this subcategory we identify a generalized set of documents that
helps to serve two purposes.
1. If a security mechanism has a document that resembles each document in the
identified set of documents we are looking for, it achieves documentation cov-
erage.
2. Also, this set of documents allows for a generalized way to refer to the docu-
mentation throughout the remainder of the paper.
There are a total of six documents in the document set. The first two documents
in the set are constant for all security mechanisms evaluated in the paper: the pro-
gramming home page[22][23] and the security home page[25][26]. Both Android and
iOS have one, and they serve as great starting points for any knowledge search that
needs to be done when creating a secure Android or iOS app.
The remainder of the documents in the set were identified through an iterative
evaluation process of the security mechanisms in this paper. It was found that when
a security mechanism was perfectly documented, the platform provided a document
that represented each of the following pages existed.
1. A vulnerability homepage associated with the security mechanism
2. A security mechanism home page
3. A pictured solution for implementing the security mechanism
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4. Complete Library documentation for the solution
The vulnerability homepage(1) explains what the vulnerability is, and the risks
associated with it; it will typically allude to the associated counter mechanisms. The
security mechanism home page(2) discusses how the mechanism works and explains
why a developer might want to implement it. The solution(3) is a page with a pictured
implementation of the security mechanism code. Please note that there is an entire
other subcategory that will evaluate the quality of the provided solution. And the
final document in the set is the library documentation(4) associated with the identified
solution. This last document is actually a set of library documents provided by the
platform. For this subset of documents to be deemed existent, all API/functions
from the solution document must be in the library docs provided by the platform.
Also note that in some cases, certain documents in the set may correspond to the
same link. For example, the solution page could be the same page as the mechanism
landing page.
The scoring for the coverage of a given security mechanism starts at a full score
of three out of three points. If any of the functionality in the solution is not docu-
mented in the library, the coverage score will receive an automatic zero out of three.
Otherwise, the total score for the coverage category will start at a max of 3, and will
be docked one point for every other document in the set that is missing. Therefore
the coverage score can receive a score of 0, 1, 2, or 3. The number value awarded
to the coverage score is directly associated with how many of the first 3 documents
in our set exist. Please note that this tally excludes the security and programming
home pages because we already know these exist, as well as the library entries.
In the actual evaluation, a table like the one in table 3.3 will often be referenced.
The check mark represents that the given document from the document set is provided
by the platform. If the check mark is missing, it means that the platform failed
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to provide a page that adequately represented that given document. In the below
example it is shown that all documents were provided in the coverage evaluation with
the exception of the iOS security mechanism homepage.
Table 3.2: Coverage Example
iOS Android
Vulnerability home page X X
Mechanism home page X
Solution X X
Library docs X X
In building the document set for the coverage evaluation it was often found that
a majority of the documents in our document set existed. But saying a document
exists is much different than saying a document exists and is discoverable. Often in
our evaluation it felt as though certain pages were not easily found, in fact, sometimes
it felt as though they were only found because their existence was important to the
research being done in this paper. It felt as though if we were developers in the same
situation, as opposed to researchers, we wouldve likely given up the search for such
information much earlier.
As a result the second category of the documentation evaluation is structure.
This category evaluates the document set identified by the coverage section for how
discoverable each of the associated documents are. This is done by evaluating how
closely interlinked each of the documents in the document set are. Since the web of
connections is difficult to describe we will use a graph to represent interconnection
of the document set like the one below. Each document will represent a node in
the graph, and a direct link between the pages will be represented by an edge in
the graph. The programming home page will be represented by the P Home node
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and the Security homepage will be represented by the Sec Home node. Vulnerability
homepage, security mechanism homepage, and solution will be represented by the
Vulnerability Home, Mechanism Home, and Solution nodes respectively. And finally,
the Library docs will be represented by the Library Docs node.
Figure 3.1: Example of Structure Graph
This evaluation is scored starting at a max score of 2 and is docked for each
violation of the following guidelines: if all documents in the document set can be
linked together into a web of direct connections the structure evaluation will receive
a full score. If just one document in the document set is two edges away, or in
other words, indirectly linked from a document in the remainder of the document set,
structure will receive a half score of 1. If a single document is two or more edges away
from all other documents in the document set, structure will receive a score of zero.
Likewise, if more than one document is more than one edge away from the majority
of the document set, structure will receive a zero. Please also note the special case
where the document set is split into two subsets of three documents each. If this
occurs, the security mechanism will receive a half score for structure. Likewise, if the
only connection between the two subsets is through the library docs document set,
the security mechanism will again receive a half score on structure. This is because a
path through the subset of library documents does not imply an intuitive direct link.
22
The final subcategory of documentation is the quality of the solution. As stated
previously, a solution is one of the 6 documents needed in the document set. Therefore
its existence and discoverability is already tested. This section is therefore concerned
with the overall quality of the solution document. This section serves as an explicit
focus on the solution document. This was deemed appropriate because it was found
that when documentation provides a clear, complete, secure, up-to-date, intuitive
solution of exactly how to implement an API, success rates of implementations sky-
rocket [27]. The solution category is scored on a scale of 0 to 3 based on these three
qualitative characteristics:
1. Pictured, secure code on a single page
2. Complete and clear instruction
3. The solution is up-to-date
The solution evaluation for each security mechanism will start at a max of 3.
Then for each of the above require characteristic that it does not meet, the score will
be decremented by 1 point. However, if the code provided uses deprecated libraries
it will receive an automatic score of zero. This is because it is terrible practice to
implement code that is not being tested continuously[28].
Note that the actual details of the solutions implementation is not of concern
in solution evaluation. This measure is only concerned with evaluating that the
respective platform has provided a legitimate solution. Chapter 3.2.2 will evaluate
the actual implementation of the solution in depth.
Comparison with Steins Documentation evaluation
There are a number of differences between this works documentation evaluation
and Steins approach. Likely the most apparent difference is its simplification. Steins
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approach consisted of five sub-evaluations, whereas our approach only has three.
This was achieved by removing Steins consistency evaluation and incorporating com-
ponents of the awareness evaluation into our coverage and structure evaluation.
Stein argued that it was necessary to measure how consistent document instruc-
tion was because when there are inconsistencies in documentation the material is
exponentially more difficult to understand when compared to an overall consistent
document set[6]. It is important to recognize that our work does not disagree with
such an idea. However, through analysis of Steins results it became clear that there
was no efficient and scientifically sound way to measure overall consistency of a large
set of documents by hand. Because of this the results for the consistency section felt
unnecessary and lacking in meaning to the overall documentation assessment.
In Steins documentation assessment, coverage, structure and awareness were also
subcategories evaluated. The coverage section sought to check that there was one page
associated with the introduction of the security mechanism, and one page to document
the APIs for the security mechanism. The structure evaluation sought to evaluate how
closely linked the documents associated with coverage were. Finally, awareness sought
to identify whether common documentation, like that of the programming homepages
and security homepage, created awareness for the need of security mechanisms by
directly talking about or linking to them.
Upon evaluation of these three categories it became clear that the evaluation of the
documentation often felt loose. The above three categories were very closely related
to one another and having them separated made the logic path to their numerical
scores uncertain in the eyes of the reader. In this paper, we attempt to tighten up that
logic path by encompassing the effect Stein was going for with his awareness category
into our structure evaluation category. By expanding the document set identified by
the coverage evaluation and then directly evaluating linkage between the documents
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in that set, the same takeaways from the original awareness category are addressed.
3.2.2 Implementation
As stated in the documentation section, an up-to-date, quality solution is often one of
the most valuable pieces of documentation a programmer can come by. However, even
with a solution, one cannot just copy and paste code into a project and expect the
respective security mechanism to work. The programmer must work to personalize
the solution so that it works with their specific project. This section of the framework
attempts to evaluate the implementation stage of the software development process.
To do this, the section will assess exactly how easy the APIs and controls associated
with a given security mechanism are to use and implement into a project.
The first criterion of the implementation section measures the level of abstraction
associated with a given security mechanisms implementation. When an API is ade-
quately abstracted it is a joy to use. The functionality of the API will feel intuitively
related to the reason that the developer decided to read about it in the first place.
And its functionality will hide the highly technical details that may cause confusion,
while highlighting the details that the developer is looking for. By measuring the
abstraction of a given API it is easy to tell whether the API has been designed with
the user of the API in mind. Therefore reflecting a major component of an APIs
usability.
We recognize that in some cases an API can be overly abstracted to a point that
the API is not flexible enough for the user. However, such a case was never an issue
in the APIs that this paper dealt with. Therefore, the more abstracted an API for
a given security mechanism is, the higher score they will receive for these criteria.
A security mechanism will receive a perfect score on abstraction if the mechanism is
abstracted as much as reasonably possible.
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In order to evaluate abstraction, we will consider two factors associated with the
solution found in the documentation assessment. First, how many implementation
choices does the developer need to make that are directly associated with configuring
the security mechanism API. A choice in this context is something like choosing a
parameter for a method associated with the security mechanism API. For example,
in implementing encryption, which encryption algorithm you use is a choice that is
directly associated with the mechanism, and therefore is a choice that will be con-
sidered in the abstraction criteria. The second factor has to do with how difficult
each choice is. This difficulty is measured by evaluating how closely related the
choice is to the high level intent of the security mechanism. With respect to the
encryption example, the high level intent of the mechanism is to encrypt data. If such
implementation simply requires the use of a single method of this form: encrypt-
Data(dataToEncrypt) -¿ encryptedData, the implementation can be considered fully
abstracted. A non-abstracted encryption implementation may require the developer
to implement everything down to the encryption algorithm[6]; thereby receiving an
abstraction score of zero. The scoring for the abstraction criteria will be scored out
of a max score of three. It will receive a score of zero if it is insufficiently abstracted,
one if moderately abstracted, and two if highly abstracted.
The above abstraction assessment adequately evaluates how much effort a devel-
oper must exert in order to configure a given security mechanism API to their liking.
However, it does not evaluate the extra effort one must exert in order to incorpo-
rate the mechanism into their project. We define this extra work done outside of
the security mechanism configuration as overhead work. And we will use the mini-
mality criterion to evaluate how much overhead work is required for a given security
mechanism implementation. Such a category is vital because it was found that im-
plementations that require a lot of overhead work often scare off developers[27]. To
better understand this category, consider the following example:
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A developer wants to implement password authentication into their app.
The actual code directly associated with the password authentication security
mechanism is easy to configure and can be written in 2 or 3 lines of code. However,
password authentication requires a UI for the user to enter their passwords into,
and there is no user interface provided with the API. As a result, in order for
the developer to implement password authentication they must also must write
the code for a keypad UI from scratch.
Such an implementation would receive a very good score in terms of its abstraction
level since the configuration of the security mechanism itself was so simple. However,
the need to build an entire UI to type the passcode into identifies that the mechanism
has a lot of overhead work. As a result, such an implementation would receive a zero
in its minimality score. Like abstraction, the minimality criteria will also be scored
out of three points. It will receive a score of zero if overhead work is greater than or
equal to that of the work associated with the security mechanism configuration work
evaluated by the abstraction criteria. It will receive a full score of 2 if the overhead
is reasonably small. And a one if the amount of overhead work is determined to be
anywhere in between the work associated with high and low scores of the minimality
criteria.
The abstraction and minimality criteria adequately evaluate APIs for the amount
of work that must be put into implementing a security mechanism correctly. However,
in the words of Joshua Bloch, a good API must also be hard to misuse[27]. What this
means is, a good API should be designed in a way that handles incorrect implementa-
tions elegantly and safely. And if a developer does missimplement the API, it ideally
should be obvious to the developer. And above all, if the mechanism is implemented
incorrectly, its mis-implementation should never undermine the underlying security
that the app already employs.
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To measure this property of a security mechanism API we have created the ro-
bustness criteria. To evaluate the robustness of a security mechanism we will consider
the results of two error in implementation of each security mechanism. We recognize
that the identification of these two potential errors impose a dimension of bias into
the evaluation, however the only way to get around this is by evaluating all possible
errors. This however is out of the scope of this paper.
Table 3.3: Robustness Matrix
Mechanism Security System Security
Certain 0/3 0/3
Plausible 1/3 0/3
Unlikely 2/3 1/3
Rare 3/3 2/3
In order to evaluate the robustness of each error, the risk matrix above will be
utilized. In evaluating each error, we will first identify which part of the application
security could be affected by the error: the mechanism security or the underlying
security. If the error can affect both the security mechanism security and the un-
derlying security, we will evaluate the table as if the error will affect the underlying
security. Next, we must identify how likely the error is. Once these two characteristic
of the error are identified the score for robustness can be calculated. This is done
by identifying the cross section cell between the likelihood of the errors occurrence
and which part of the application security the error could effect. Please note that
although this criteria evaluates multiple errors, the final score for robustness is the
lowest robustness score of the chosen error evaluations. Also worth noting is that the
max score for a potential error that could affect the underlying security of the app is
a 2/3, this is because any risk to underlying app security is a major issue.
28
Comparison with Steins Implementation evaluation
Unlike the documentation section, all three of the criteria used in this papers
implementation evaluation are directly related to criteria identified in Steins paper.
It was felt that Steins Abstraction, minimality, and robustness criteria actually did a
fantastic job of evaluating the overall usability of a security mechanisms implemen-
tation.
The one change made in this section was the removal of a criteria called consis-
tency. This criterion was extremely similar to the consistency criterion removed in
the documentation section. He identified that inconsistencies often create confusion
in implementation. This paper agrees with such a statement. However, in evalu-
ating Steins results we found that these criteria, like the consistency criteria in the
documentation section, yielded results that did not add much insight into the over-
all evaluation. Plus, the methodology in evaluating consistency felt inadequate and
therefore the results didnt feel reliable enough to report on.
Also worth noting is that we made some slight changes to the robustness table.
The table as a whole maintains the same scoring pattern, it is just smaller.
3.2.3 Testing
As previously mentioned, the evaluation framework in this paper is meant to mirror
that of a typical software development cycle. After a developer has learned about
the security mechanism API and implemented it, the software should be tested to
verify its functionality. One could argue that the testing phase is solely the devel-
opers responsibility, not the platforms. However, the idea behind this evaluation is
to identify which platform, iOS or Android, best supports the developer in imple-
menting the security mechanism. As a result, if the respective platform does help
the developer test their implementation of each security mechanism, the robustness
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of the implementation can be guaranteed with more certainty. When a developer can
guarantee the robustness of an implementation, the respective implementation is, by
default, more usable.
The first and only criteria of the evaluation is the addressed criterion. The purpose
of this category is to simply evaluate whether the respective platform supplies the
developer with the appropriate tools to test the functionality of the given security
mechanism. Testing tools can vary greatly depending on the security mechanism.
Whatever the means of testing is, the evaluation will be scored out of 2. If the
platform addresses testing of the security mechanism in any of its documentation,
the criteria receives one point. Then if it is provided, it must be verified that the
testing material sufficiently tests the implementation. If it does the criteria receives
a full score of 2/2. If it is not at all addressed in the documentation set the criteria
will receive a 0/2.
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Chapter 4
EVALUATION
4.1 Insecure Data Storage
The iOS and Android provided security mechanisms associated with OWASPs 2nd
most common mobile vulnerability, insecure data storage, will be evaluated. The
security mechanisms being evaluates in this section are encryption, MACs and key
storage.
4.1.1 Encryption
Documentation
Both iOS and Android receive full marks on their coverage for encryption as all
of the necessary document types for both platforms are provided.
Table 4.1: iOS and Android Encryption Coverage
iOS Android
Secure Data Storage home page X X
Encryption home page X X
Encryption Solution X X
Library docs X X
Recall that documents for iOS and Android may be admitted into the document
set as long as they are in their respective platforms primary or secondary database.
Because of this, the coverage evaluation yielded interesting results for encryption.
Compared to all other coverage evaluations, the encryption coverage evaluation found
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the highest number of documents, for both iOS and Android, originating from their
respective secondary database. This is interesting because it shows that neither plat-
form has made much of an effort to build upon their original encryption documenta-
tion. All iOS documents with the exception of the library entries are from its legacy
database. And Android is just one off from iOS, having both its encryption landing
page and solution residing in Javadocs. For reference, no other coverage evaluation
in this paper had more than one document from their set residing in the respective
platforms secondary database.
Figure 4.1: iOS Encryption Documentation Structure
Figure 4.2: Android Encryption Documentation Structure
The layout of the iOS encryption document set was well connected with the excep-
tion of the solution. The solution turned out to be a stand-alone Objective-C project
called CryptoCompatability[29]. It was mentioned as a useful existing project on the
encryption homepage, however no functioning link accompanied the mention. As a
result it was only found through a Google search. Despite its isolation the project
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was quite useful. CryptoCompatability[29] was intended to teach developers about
the low-level C cryptography library commonCrypto. As a result, it not only ran
examples for symmetric and asymmetric encryption, but also for MACs and numer-
ous other cryptographic operations. It even supplied the developer with test data to
verify correct implementation of cryptographic mechanisms.
Since the iOS solution was more than one link away from the remainder of the
document set, the security mechanism would typically receive a score of zero on its
structure. But this evaluation turned out to be a special case. The solution title was
mentioned in the security mechanism homepage as a very useful project for learning
about iOS encryption. It just wasnt linked. As a result the iOS encryption structure
evaluation will receive one out of two points.
Interestingly for Android, they have left pretty much all of their useful cryptog-
raphy documentation to be found in Javadocs, their secondary database. As a result,
there is a very clear split between their introductory document set pages and their
encryption specific documents. The most convenient way to find their cryptography
documentation is by going through the library documentation subset. As a result of
this split, Android will receive half points for its structure score.
The iOS solution is found as a standalone Xcode project. The project is written
up-to-date objective-C code, and is secure. The instructions associated with the
solution are simply comments within the project. As a result, the iOS encryption
solution will receive a full score on its solution. However, it is worth noting that since
the directions are commented into the code, the code is slightly less readable. The
solution would likely be a lot easier to follow if there were a separate document with
instructions and code snippets to accompany the project.
The Android encryption solution is conveniently on the same page as the Android
encryption home page. This page is titled the Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA)
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and contains information regarding all cryptographic libraries supported by Java.
Android simply adopted Javas cryptography API for all of its cryptographic use cases.
At the top of this page is a table of contents that makes it simple to jump directly to
the content that you desire. For example, encryption is clearly linked at the top of it.
The only issue with this layout is how it provides code solutions. Because the page
is so large, the encryption solution and its instructions are fragmented. Although
the solution is still secure, up to data and well annotated; it feels as though it is too
spread out. Since this issue is similar to the requirement that states the solution must
be presented on one page, the Android encryption solution is docked one point. As a
result, it receives a score of two out of three on its solution.
Encryption Implementation
As stated in the documentation evaluation, cryptographic documentation for both
iOS and Android have been somewhat neglected. This is because neither platform
has spent much time building upon their original implementations. Apple requires
the developer to work with a low-level C library called commonCrypto[30] to handle a
majority of cryptography needs. And Android still requires their developers to work
with the original Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) [31] that they first adopted
in their original creation of the platform.
The first step in both asymmetric and symmetric encryption for Android is get-
ting an instance of the KeyGenerator[32] and the Cipher[14] for the specific type of
encryption. Both steps require using the respective classs content provider. To get an
instance of a given class from their content provider the developer must use the respec-
tive classs .getInstance() method. When retrieving an instance for the KeyGenerator,
one must be careful to pass the correct algorithm. Likewise, the getInstance request
for the cipher requires a parameter that is referred to as the transformation. The
transformation takes on the form algorithm/mode/padding. As long as the algorithm
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being passed to the key generator and the cipher content providers are compatible,
the encryption code below will work.
Listing 4.1: Symmetric Encryption (Android - Java)
1 KeyGenerator keyGenerator = KeyGenerator.getInstance("AES");
2 SecretKey secretKey = keyGenerator.generateKey ();
3 Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding");
4 cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE , secretKey);
5 GCMParameterSpec gcmParameterSpec = new GCMParameterSpec (0, cipher.
getIV ());
6 byte[] dataToEncrypt = ...
7 byte[] encryptedData = cipher.doFinal(dataToEncrypt);
Listing 4.2: Asymmetric Encryption (Android - Java)
1 KeyPairGenerator keyGenerator = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("RSA");
2 KeyPair keyPair = keyGenerator.generateKeyPair ();
3 Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("RSA/NONE/OAEPPadding");
4 cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE , keyPair.getPrivate ());
5 byte[] dataToEncrypt = ...
6 byte[] encryptedData = cipher.doFinal(dataToEncrypt);
Once an instance of the cipher and the key are created all one must do is initialize
the cipher with the specified key, and its mode: init(int opmode, Key key). Then using
the doFinal method the cipher will encrypt the input data returning the encrypted
data. Also notice that decrypting is quite simple too. The exact same process is
used for decryption except the developer must change the opmode in the cipher
initialization to DECRYPT MODE.
As identified, there are many configurations that must be decided upon when
encrypting data. And as OWASP identifies[33], there are a number of configurations
that are inherently bad implementations of encryption. Some common errors include
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picking an insecure algorithm, picking a key length that is too small or even using a
non cryptographically secure PRNG for the key. Because of the numerous possibilities
that can arise in encryption implementation, abstraction of the respective API is likely
the most important factor in assessing an encryption APIs usability.
Because there are so many parameters that an encryption API could leave up to
the developer an ideal implementation in the scope of this paper would be one that
requires no input from the developer. The encryption API call would be secure by
default. However, Android chose not to do this, likely because they wanted to leave
space for flexible implementation for the many experienced programmer that use the
API. Instead Android chose to create a thin layer of abstraction that only requires
the developer to specify the algorithm, mode of operation and padding. Upon further
investigation this degree of abstraction actually makes a lot of sense. It still allows
experienced programmers to implement flexible encryption designs. But at the same
time, considers less experienced programmers, and only reveals the need for decision
on three of the more common characteristic of encryption. Still though, Android
receives a half score on its abstraction. The Android encryption implementation for
symmetric and asymmetric encryption is quite simple to incorporate into an existing
project. As a result, it will receive full marks on minimality.
Although a number of the parameters for Android encryption are abstracted, the
API still requires the developer to know about a number of complex characteristics
of encryption. The Android developer must specify the algorithm, mode and padding
for the cipher, as well as the algorithm for the key. Despite the fact that Android
Studio will warn the developer in certain cases: like when ECB mode is used, typically
it will not. As a result, any error in parameter specification will render the entire
encryption security mechanism useless. Such an issue is likely since Android still
supports a number of insecure encryption algorithms[34]. Therefore Android receives
zero points for Encryption implementation robustness.
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In contrast to Android, and somewhat frustratingly, the iOS implementation for
encryption varies across symmetric and asymmetric encryption. Symmetric encryp-
tion is implemented through the commonCrypto[30] API; a low-level C library. And
asymmetric encryption is implemented through the Certificates, Keys, and Trust ser-
vices API.
Listing 4.3: Symmetric Encryption (iOS - Objective-C)
1 uint8_t * symmetricKey = NULL;
2 NSData * symmetricKeyRef = NULL;
3 symmetricKey = malloc( kCCKeySizeAES128 * sizeof(uint8_t) );
4 memset ((void *) symmetricKey , 0x0 , kCCKeySizeAES128);
5 int result = SecRandomCopyBytes(kSecRandomDefault , kCCKeySizeAES128 ,
symmetricKey);
6 symmetricKeyRef = [[ NSData alloc] initWithBytes :(const void *)
symmetricKey length:kCCKeySizeAES128 ];
7 uint8_t iv_tmp[kCCBlockSizeAES128 ];
8 memset ((void *) iv_tmp , 0x0 , (size_t) sizeof(iv_tmp));
9 result = SecRandomCopyBytes(kSecRandomDefault , kCCBlockSizeAES128 ,
iv_tmp);
10 NSData* iv = [NSData dataWithBytes :( const void *) iv_tmp length:
kCCBlockSizeAES128 ];
11 size_t outLength;
12 NSData * dataToEncrypt = ...
13 NSMutableData *cipherData = [NSMutableData dataWithLength:
dataToEncrypt.length + kCCBlockSizeAES128 ];
14 CCCryptorStatus result = CCCrypt(
15 kCCEncrypt , // operation
16 kCCAlgorithmAES128 , // algorithm
17 kCCOptionPKCS7Padding , // options
18 symmetricKeyRef.bytes , // key
19 symmetricKeyRef.length , // keylength
20 iv.bytes , // iv
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21 dataToEncrypt.bytes , // dataIn
22 dataToEncrypt.length , // dataInLength ,
23 cipherData.mutableBytes , // dataOut
24 cipherData.length , // dataOutAvailable
25 &outLength); // dataOutMoved
Listing 4.4: Asymmetric Encryption (iOS - Objective-C)
1 NSMutableDictionary *keyPairAttributes = [[ NSMutableDictionary alloc
] init];
2 [keyPairAttr setObject :( __bridge id)kSecAttrKeyTypeRSA forKey :(
__bridge id)kSecAttrKeyType ];
3 [keyPairAttr setObject :[ NSNumber numberWithInt :2048] forKey :(
__bridge id)kSecAttrKeySizeInBits ];
4 SecKeyRef publicKey = NULL;
5 SecKeyRef privateKey = NULL;
6 OSStatus status = SecKeyGeneratePair (( __bridge CFDictionaryRef)
keyPairAttr , &publicKey , &privateKey);
7 size_t cipherDataSize;
8 uint8_t *cipherData;
9 const uint8_t dataToEncrypt [] = ...
10 size_t dataLength = sizeof(dataToEncrypt)/sizeof(dataToEncrypt [0]);
11 encryptedDataSize = SecKeyGetBlockSize(publicKey);
12 encryptedData = malloc(cipherBufferSize);
13 OSStatus status = SecKeyEncrypt(
14 publicKey , // key
15 kSecPaddingOAEP , // padding
16 dataToEncrypt , // dataIn
17 (size_t) dataLength ,// dataInLength
18 cipherData , // dataOut
19 &cipherDataSize); // dataOutAvailable
20 return cipherData;
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Unlike the Android API for encryption, iOS actually does provide a default for
the encryption mode of operation: CBC and GCM. One other bright spot is that the
system does use a cryptographically secure PRNG. However, compared to Android,
the iOS encryption implementations, especially the symmetric implementation are
barely abstracted. The symmetric implementation requires the developer to specify
every other parameter of encryption aside from the mode of operation. Despite asym-
metric implementation being quite a bit simpler to implement our score must reflect
the lowest of the two. As a result, the iOS encryption abstraction score will receive
a zero because of the difficulty of implementation for symmetric encryption.
The overhead for asymmetric encryption using the Certificates, Keys, and Trust
services API is quite minimal. All of the steps are well documented in the documen-
tation and can be easily implemented by a swift developer because it is written in
objective-C. However, in order for a developer to implement symmetric encryption
they must be familiar with C memory management, pointers and other C program-
ming patterns. Because symmetric encryption requires the developer to be familiar
with C, the overhead work is considered to be quite high, but still slightly less than
that of the decisions that must be made in configuring the security mechanism. As a
result of this, iOS encryption will receive a score of one out of two on its minimality.
The robustness for iOS encryption will receive a zero as a result of its symmetric
encryption implementation. The primary issue with the symmetric encryption API
is that it requires the developer to write C code. It is simply unrealistic to expect
swift developers to be comfortable implementing in C. As a result of the necessity for
C code, data vulnerabilities like buffer overflows are now an issue. Such an issue runs
the risk of undermining underlying system security. Because it is plausible for the
underlying app security to be affected, the robustness of iOS encryption receives a
zero. Also worth noting is that nearly every property of the encryption configuration
is left up to the discretion of the developer. Like the Android assessment Xcode will
39
not warn the developer of incorrect encryption specification and this further decreases
the robustness of an iOS encryption implementation.
Encryption Testing
Encryption is a difficult security mechanism to test because it is near impossible to
identify that the transformed data has been scrambled in a cryptographically secure
manner. In fact, the only effective way for a developer to verify that their encryption
implementation has been implemented correctly is by verifying with a known test
input and output. Therefore, in order for the respective platforms to fully satisfy the
encryption addressed criteria, the platform must supply the developer with test input
and output data for the developer to use in unit tests of their implementations.
Unfortunately, Android does not support the developer at all in testing the encryp-
tion implementation. They do not supply the developer with any test data. Apple
on the other hand does support the developer in testing the cryptographic implemen-
tations through their cryptographic project CryptoCompatability. The project is an
OS X project that not only contains a decently large set of cryptographic methods
that can be used in iOS project. It also has complimentary input and output test
data. Therefore iOS receives a full score on its addressed score and Android receives
a zero.
Just to further test the reliability of the iOS test resources, and verify that the An-
droid implementation was correctly we tested our encryption implementations with
NISTs Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP). Luckily both the An-
droid and iOS implementations were correct.
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4.1.2 MAC
Documentation
The coverage evaluation for iOS receives a score of two out of three because a
page that could represent the landing page for message authentication codes (MACs)
did not exist. Android on the other hand fully satisfied the coverage requirements.
Table 4.2: iOS and Android MAC Coverage
iOS Android
Secure Data Storage home page X X
MAC home page X
MAC Solution X X
Library docs X X
Since MACs are another cryptographic feature it turned out that their solution was
actually located in the same project as the encryption solution. However, in contrast
to the encryption evaluation, it was not mentioned anywhere that the MAC code
could be found in the project labelled cryptocampatability. In fact the only reason
this solution was found was because we came across it in our encryption evaluation.
In the case of encryption, a developer would have at least had a chance at finding this
code since it was mentioned on the encryption home page. However, MACs for iOS
have no such home page, and likewise have no mention of the project. As a result,
the MAC security mechanism will receive a score of zero on its structure for iOS.
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Figure 4.3: iOS MAC Documentation Structure
Figure 4.4: Android MAC Documentation Structure
Interestingly the Android graph for MAC structure exactly resembles the Android
graph for encryption structure. This is because Android uses the Javadocs cryptog-
raphy architecture documentation to present all things cryptography in the Android
library. As a result both encryption and MAC are clearly presented in the same
Javadocs documentation with clearly defined landing pages and solutions. Unfortu-
nately, like encryption, the java doc cryptography architecture docs are only linked
to the other documents in the set through the library subset. As a result, Android
will receive 1 out of 2 points for its structure.
The solution provided by iOS for MACs thoroughly resembled that of the solutions
we identified in the encryption section since this solution was part of the same project
called Cryptocompatability. Like those encryption solutions, the iOS MAC solution
was pictured, secure and up-to-date. The only downside of the MAC solution was that
the discussion was through comments in the project. As mentioned in the encryption
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section we would have preferred to have a page where code and instruction were
separated. However, a project with instructions written as comments inline with the
code satisfies the requirements for complete instruction. As a result iOS receives a
full score on solution.
The Android solution is found on the Java cryptography architecture guide(JCA)[31].
As stated in the encryption section, the document maintains a table of contents at
the top of it. So despite how large it is, it is easy to navigate to a given topic. For
example, it is easy to navigate to the section on MACs. However, the actual code for
MACs is scattered across the page, and despite it all being on one page, it feels as
though the solution is split across multiple pages. As a result the Android solution
for MACs will receive a score of two out of three since the solution feels fragmented.
Aside from this fact the code provided is secure, up-to-date, and has clear associated
instruction.
Implementation
Like Android encryption, MACs are supported by the Java Cryptography archi-
tecture (JCA), implemented as javax.crypto. As a result, the MAC implementation
follows the almost exact same implementation pattern as that of Android encryption.
The developer must first use a content provider to get an instance of a keyGenerator
and an instance of a Mac object. The Mac and keyGenerator request only requires
the message authentication code algorithm as an argument. While the concept of a
keyGenerator is simple, one may want to think of the Mac object as being similar to
the cipher object described in the encryption section, but it will calculate a MAC for
the inputted data instead of encrypted data. It is also important to note that the
algorithm specified for the keyGenerator must match the algorithm specified for the
Mac object like it had to for encryption. Once the key and Mac objects are created
the mac is initialized with the secret key and the developer can use the dofinal()
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function to calculate the MAC for the inputted data.
Listing 4.5: MAC implementation (Android - Java)
1 KeyGenerator keyGenerator = KeyGenerator.getInstance("HmacSHA256");
2 SecretKey secretKey = keyGenerator.generateKey ();
3 Mac mac = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256");
4 mac.init(secretKey);
5 byte[] hash = mac.doFinal("String to Hash".getBytes ());
Despite the fact that the MAC implementation for Android is implemented using
the same design pattern as encryption, it will be rewarded a higher abstraction score.
This is because in Android encryption there were three characteristics that a developer
that is unfamiliar with encryption would have had to research: algorithm, mode of
operation and padding schemes. As a result of that evaluation, Android encryption
was awarded a half score on abstraction. In the case of MACs all that the developer
must specify is the MAC algorithm. Since there is only one decision that must be made
in this implementation and any others are abstracted away, the Android abstraction
score for MACs will receive a full score.
Like for encryption, Android studio will seldom notify the developer that they
are making use of an insecure hash algorithm when implementing an HMAC. For
example, Android studio does not warn against using MD5 in MAC implementation.
Since Android still supports insecure algorithms, such a error is considered plausible.
And since there is only one argument that needs to be decided on, as opposed to the
three required by Android encryption, MAC for Android will receive one out of three
points for robustness.
Like symmetric encryption, MACs on iOS are supported by the commonCrypto
library. As a result the developer must do a fair amount of up front work in C.
Then once all of the initialization is done the developer must call the commonCrypto
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function CCHMAC() which will calculate and place the MAC into the functions last
argument.
Listing 4.6: MAC implementation (iOS - Objective-C)
1 uint8_t * tmpKey = malloc(CC_SHA256_BLOCK_BYTES * sizeof(uint8_t) );
2 memset ((void *)tmpKey , 0x0 , CC_SHA256_BLOCK_BYTES);
3 int result = SecRandomCopyBytes(kSecRandomDefault ,
CC_SHA256_BLOCK_BYTES , tmpKey);
4 NSData * keyAsData = [[ NSData alloc] initWithBytes :( const void *)
tmpKey length:CC_SHA256_BLOCK_BYTES ];
5 NSString* stringToHash = @"StringToHash ";
6 NSData *dataToHash = [stringToHash dataUsingEncoding:
NSUTF8StringEncoding ];
7 NSMutableData *hash = [NSMutableData dataWithLength:
CC_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
8 CCHmac( kCCHmacAlgSHA1 , [keyAsData bytes], [keyAsData length], [
dataToHash bytes], [dataToHash length], [hash mutableBytes ]);
Despite the difficulty of preparation to implement MACs in iOS, the level of
abstraction is not awful. Generating a Mac for a given piece of data only requires one
API call to commonCrypto. And this call only requires one decision: which MAC
algorithm to use. Since this is the same case as Androids MAC abstraction, iOS will
receive a full score for its abstraction.
The iOS minimality score for the MAC implementation is a whole different story
compared to its abstraction score. Similar to the encryption implementation, the
MAC implementation requires the developer to be familiar with C design patterns
like memory management. As a result there is a quite a bit of set up in C in order
to generate a MAC for a given segment of data. Unlike the encryption implemen-
tation however, the amount of overhead work heavily outweighs the amount of work
considered in the abstraction evaluation. As a result iOS MAC minimality score will
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receive a zero out of two.
The configuration for iOS MACs is quite comparable to that of the Android MAC
implementation. It requires the developer to specify the algorithm for the MAC
implementation, while not enforcing the use of secure algorithms in their respective
environments. If this were the only identifiable error, iOS would receive a half score
for MAC robustness. However, since there is the added likelihood that the C overhead
work could introduce an underlying system insecurity; iOS will receive a zero for its
MAC robustness score.
Testing
The testing evaluation for MACs is very similar to that of the encryption evalua-
tion. Android provided no support whatsoever for testing MACs. Therefore Android
received a score of zero on its testing being address. Apple does actually provide
testing data for the implementation of SHA-1 in its cryptocompatability project like
it did for encryption. However, it unfortunately does not provide test data for SHA-
256. Because of this iOS will receive a half score on its testing being addressed. Like
with encryption we verified the MAC generation with test data from CAVP[35] and
found that both Android and iOS implemented MAC generation using SHA-1 and
SHA-256 correctly.
4.1.3 Key Storage
Documentation
Unlike the documentation for encryption and MACs, Key storage for both iOS
and Android is quite thorough. The document mapping shows that both iOS and
Android will receive a full score for their coverage of the topic.
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Table 4.3: iOS and Android Key Storage Coverage
iOS Android
Secure Data Storage home page X X
Key Storage home page X X
Key Storage Solution X X
Library docs X X
One thing to note in regards to the iOS documentation is that there were du-
plicates for each of the security mechanism specific documents in the document set.
As discussed in the methodology, section 3, iOSs documents are valid candidates for
the document set if they come from one of the platforms two document databases:
the developer guide or the legacy database. Oddly for the case of iOS key storage,
there were documents from both the developer guide and the legacy database that
could justifiably represent every single document in the document set. Although this
mostly bolstered the certainty of full coverage of Key Storage related content, such
duplication often made our selection for the most reliable information difficult. With
that said, all necessary information was easily found in the developer guide. So such
difficulty in choosing the correct documents likely would not have been an issue for
the average developer. The average developer would likely have found everything
they need in the developer guide, and not even realize the duplicate information.
Figure 4.5: iOS Key Storage Documentation Structure
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Figure 4.6: Android Key Storage Documentation Structure
The iOS key Storage structure will receive a full score for its structure. This is
a result of the fact that the security home page was well linked to the Key storage
documentation. The secure data storage homepage, the key storage homepage and
the solution are all only indirectly linked across the library docs. But because the
security homepage directly linked to each of these pages the iOS structure still receives
full points.
The odd iOS structure is a result of two issues in regards to the iOS documenta-
tion. First of all the secure data storage home page document for iOS is located in
the legacy database while the remainder of the documents in the document set are
located in the developer guide. The Legacy documents almost never link directly to
the developer guide since they are typically created before the developer guide. The
secondary reason is that Apple associates introductory material on the keychain with
storing user information. As a result, the only solutions linked to the introductory
keychain material is how to store a password in the keychain. Its introductory mate-
rial does not discuss its use case for a cryptographic key. In order for a developer to
find the solution for using the keychain with cryptographic keys, the developer must
look at the certificates, key, and trust services API documentation directly linked at
the security home page.
The Android Key Storage Structure will also receive a full score on its structure.
All pages are appropriately represented and linked through the Android developer
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guide. Android also conveniently has a number of solutions pasted onto the KeyStore
home page making an implementation especially simple. Also worth noting, Android
has directly linked extra examples that show how to use the Keystore with different
types of keys at the KeyGenParameterSpec library entry. Such examples include
RSA key pairs, AES keys, and HMAC keys. The KeyStore homepage also links to an
Android Studio project with an example of how to use the keyStore.
Android provides numerous usable and secure examples of how to use the Key-
store. On the Key storage homepage they show how to create cryptographic keys and
how to put them into the key store. Plus this page also links to a number of variation
solution examples on the KeyGenParameterSpec library entry. It also links to an ex-
ample project and more examples on the actual KeyStore API documentation. One
thing to note is that many of the examples automatically add the key to the keystore
upon its creation. However, only the example in the KeyStore API documentation
does a simple store and fetch of an existing key. Regardless each of the examples are
very useful. The solution being considered in our evaluation is the one that stores
an existing key. This example is located on the keystore home page and is secure,
up-to-date and has clear instructions. Therefore Android Key Storage receives a full
score on solution.
Like the Android documentation, iOS actually shows multiple implementations of
how to use the keystore as well. It gives an example of how to store and receive the key
associated with a password as well as how to store a cryptographic key. It also has a
sample project in the legacy documentation, not linked to the document set however.
The solution associated with the storage of a cryptographic key is the solution being
examined in this section. It is secure, up-to-date and has clear instructions. It even
links to how to create cryptographically secure keys. As a result iOS will also receive
a full score on its solution.
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Implementation
Because both iOS and Android provided so many usable solutions we decided
that we would assess the simplest case. In this section we evaluate the case when a
developer is attempting to store an already existing key into the platforms respective
key storage mechanism.
Key Storage is vital to a secure but enjoyable user experience because it securely
stores sensitive key data, while maintaining quick access to such keys in the right
situations. For example, a user would not want to enter their password for a given
app every time they open it. However, they do not want the system to store such
sensitive data unless it is secure. The respective platforms key storage system is the
entity that makes sure that such a key is securely stored and only reachable by the
appropriate app. With this architecture, when a key is added to the keyStore it is
automatically encrypted and stored. After this, the only time that the key may be
accessed again is when the phone is unlocked by the device password; and then only
the specific app that has access to it may be granted access to said key.
The Android implementation is quite simple. All the developer must do in terms
of configuration for use is call the KeyStore content provider for an instance of the
Android KeyStore. As a result the only decision of the developer is to specify which
keyStore they would like to use by passing the name of the requested keystore. In
order to use the Android key store the developer must pass AndroidKeyStore as a
parameter to the getInstance() method of the KeyStore. Once the instance is created
one can easily add and query the Android KeyStore with the setEntry and getEntry
methods. One can simply add the key to the Keystore by passing a chosen alias
name and the key as a parameter to the setEntry() method. Then to retrieve the
key, simply load the KeyStore and use the getEntry() method with the alias as a
parameter to retrieve that same key.
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Listing 4.7: Key Storage implementation (Android - Java)
1 // store key
2 SecretKey secretKey = ...;
3 KeyStore keyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("AndroidKeyStore");
4 KeyStore.SecretKeyEntry secretKeyEntry = new KeyStore.SecretKeyEntry
(secretKey);
5 keyStore.setEntry("NameForKey", secretKeyEntry , null);
6
7 // retrieve key
8 keyStore.load(null);
9 SecretKey secretKey = (SecretKey) keyStore.getKey("keyName", null);
One could argue that Android could further abstract the content provider so that
by default it would return the Android KeyStore. However I do not think such
increased abstraction is necessary. The content provider is written this way so that
it is simple to read. If the keyStore specification were omitted, it would be less clear
where exactly the keys are being stored, and it would also cover up the fact that one
can make use of multiple Keystores. As a result we will grade Android Key storage
to be fully abstracted. There is also virtually no overhead for this implementation.
And finally the implementation will receive a full score on its robustness as there is no
place where one would expect the developer to make a mistake that could undermine
security. Even if they chose a different keystore the key would remain secure.
The process to store an iOS cryptographic key into keychain is also quite simple.
It will be considered completely abstracted because the only decisions made by the
developer are the choice of key and the keys associated type. The programmer must
specify these characteristic by creating a dictionary with keys kSecClass and kSec-
ValueData. Once the dictionary is created there is one API call necessary to add the
key to the keychain. By passing specified dictionary to the method SecItemAdd the
key is safely added to the keychain. To retrieve the data the exact same process is
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carried out, but with the SecItemCopyMatching() keychain API call. Like the An-
droid API call, pretty much all of the information about how the key is being stored is
abstracted away. This creates an easy configuration for the developer, but maintains
security of the keys because the keychain will only return to the apps with the correct
permissions.
Listing 4.8: Key Storage implementation (iOS - Objective-C)
1 // store key
2 NSData *key = ... ;
3 NSMutableDictionary *attributeDictionary = [[ NSMutableDictionary
alloc] init];
4
5 [attributeDictionary setObject :( __bridge id)kSecClassGenericPassword
forKey :( __bridge id)kSecClass ];
6 [attributeDictionary setObject:key forKey :( __bridge id)kSecValueData
];
7
8 OSStatus status = SecItemAdd (( CFDictionaryRef)attributeDictionary ,
NULL);
9
10 // retrieve key
11 NSMutableDictionary *queryDictionary = [[ NSMutableDictionary alloc]
init];
12
13 [queryDictionary setObject :( __bridge id)kSecClassGenericPassword
forKey :( __bridge id)kSecClass ];
14 [queryDictionary setObject :( _bridge id)kCFBooleanTrue forKey :(
__bridge id)kSecReturnData ];
15
16 CFTypeRef result = NULL;
17 OSStatus status = SecItemCopyMatching (( __bridge CFDictionaryRef)
queryDictionary , &result);
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While the actual implementation does not require any C programming, the key-
chain API is written in C. As a result the developer must carry out a fair amount of
overhead work to properly prepare the dictionary and result data to be compatible
with the API call. For example, there is a quite a bit of type casting required in the
lead up to the call. It is however noted that none of this overhead requires advanced
experience in C. Because of this, key storage for iOS will just be docked one point on
its minimality.
Despite the overhead C preparation the iOS implementation will still receive a
full score on its robustness. Like for Android, there is no error that would render
the security mechanism or that of the underlying system security insecure. The only
likely errors identified was incorrect dictionary format and/or incorrect type casting,
which would both throw exceptions upon the API call.
Testing
Both iOS and Android will receive not applicable (N/A) for their testing being
addressed for key storage. This is because the testing of key storage is somewhat
implied with its correct implementation. In order to test it we simply stored a key
in the respective platforms keystore and attempted to retrieve the key to verify its
existence in the Keychain. This was confirmed to work in both Android and iOS.
In order to further test the keychain we tested to make sure that keys were only
accessible by the correct apps. Through this effort it was confirmed that the keystore
operated as expected, only granting access to the apps that store the specified keys
for both iOS and Android. Steins paper took this testing phase one step further
to investigate the effects of a jailbroken or rooted device on the functionality of the
keystore. This was not performed in this iteration of the evaluation.
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4.2 Insecure Communication
In this section we will assess the usability of security mechanism APIs that address
OWASPs 3rd most common mobile insecurity; insecure communication. This section
will evaluate the the platform provided implementations for HTTPS and certificate
pinning.
4.2.1 HTTPS
Documentation
As the below document mapping indicates, both iOS and Android have great cov-
erage on the information necessary for implementing their provided HTTPS mecha-
nism. This was somewhat expected as HTTPS is essentially a giv in in the current
technological climate. Still however, it is great to prove that both platforms are both
thoroughly documenting a somewhat trivial implementation. As a result both will
receive a full score on their HTTPS coverage.
Table 4.4: iOS and Android HTTPS Coverage
iOS Android
Secure Comms home page X X
HTTPS home page X X
HTTPS Solution X X
Library docs X X
As seen below, the structure of the Android documentation set is extremely effec-
tive. The security homepage has a guide and samples section that directly links to
the secure communication page which is located in a spot that is easy for developers
to find. Once on the Android secure communication home page one can directly link
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to the HTTPS mechanism page and the solution through the navigation bar as well
as through a link in the secure communication text. Also the Android Solution and
mechanism page are one in the same. As a result, Android will receive a full score
for its HTTPS documentation structure.
Figure 4.7: iOS HTTPS Documentation Structure
Figure 4.8: Android HTTPS Documentation Structure
The structure for iOS was good with the exception of the location for the HTTPS
homepage. Because all pages except for the HTTPS homepage were directly linked,
iOS will receive half marks. The documentation for iOS HTTPS again identifies a
frustrating feature of the iOS documentation. Apple has two two primary locations
for their iOS documentation. As discussed, there is a legacy database that contains a
lot of great information of the fundamentals of the iOS platform. However it is often
outdated implementing deprecated APIs. And there is the more modern developers
guide that seems to have continuous maintenance. In this evaluation it was seen that
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all but the HTTPS homepage were linked together in the more modern developers
guide. This is not of huge concern because one is able to implement HTTPS without
the HTTPS home page; however if the developer is unfamiliar with HTTPS concepts,
this indirect linkage is a major drawback to understanding the importance of using
HTTPS.
The solution for Android HTTPS receives a perfect score. The solution is conve-
niently located in Androids HTTPS homepage, it is pictured, secure, and up-to-date.
It also has clear and complete instructions inline with the solution to increase clarity.
The iOS HTTPS solution receives a score of 3 out of 3 also. The solution provided
by iOS is pictured, secure, up-to-date and provides detailed instruction with its code
sample. However it is worth noting that the iOS solution instructions are a bit harder
to follow than Androids because there are two ways to implement HTTPS in iOS.
One can implement a simplified use of iOSs HTTPS API which makes use of the
singleton shared instance for the URLSession class. This is what the first half of this
document discusses. However any experienced programmer will be quick to recog-
nize that implementing this singleton class results in restricted flexibility in regards
to their networking settings. For example, it would not be possible to implement
certificate pinning in the correct manner with the singleton instance. Apples doc-
umentation does handle this issue with grace by clearly identifying such drawbacks
with an explanation and code snippets of the more flexible implementation. But as
a result the documentation requires more reading than likely necessary; especially
when compared to Androids documentation.
Implementation
As stated previously, there were two ways to implement iOS. In both cases iOS
requires the developer to use what they refer to as the URL loading system, which is
there framework that interfaces with standard internet protocols like HTTPS.
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The solution provided by iOS can be found on a page titled Fetching Website Data
into Memory. As stated prior we are using the more flexible version of the HTTPS
implementation. The simplified version uses a singleton class for quick use, while the
more flexible version requires the developer to set up a delegate for the URLSession
instance being used. The following code is pictured on the Fetching Website Data
into Memory page that was identified as the iOS HTTPS solution page.
Listing 4.9: Creating a URLSession that uses a Delegate (iOS - Swift)
1 private lazy var session: URLSession = {
2 let configuration = URLSessionConfiguration.default
3 configuration.waitsForConnectivity = true
4 return URLSession(configuration: configuration , delegate: self ,
delegateQueue: nil)
5 }()
Listing 4.10: Using a Delegate with a URL session data task (iOS - Swift)
1 var receivedData: Data?
2
3 func startLoad_delegate () {
4 loadButton.isEnabled = false
5 print ("In startload 1")
6 let url = URL(string: "http ://www.facebook.com/")!
7 receivedData = Data()
8 let task = session.dataTask(with: url)
9 print ("In startload 2")
10 task.resume ()
11 print ("In startload 3")
12 }
13
14 // delegate methods
15
16 func urlSession(_ session: URLSession , dataTask: URLSessionDataTask ,
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didReceive response: URLResponse ,
17 completionHandler: @escaping (URLSession.
ResponseDisposition) -> Void) {
18 guard let response = response as? HTTPURLResponse ,
19 (200...299).contains(response.statusCode),
20 let mimeType = response.mimeType ,
21 mimeType == "text/html" else {
22 completionHandler (. cancel)
23 print (" Cancelled .\n")
24 return
25 }
26 print(" Success .\n")
27 completionHandler (.allow)
28 }
29
30 func urlSession(_ session: URLSession , dataTask: URLSessionDataTask ,
didReceive data: Data) {
31 self.receivedData ?. append(data)
32 }
33
34 func urlSession(_ session: URLSession , task: URLSessionTask ,
didCompleteWithError error: Error?) {
35 DispatchQueue.main.async {
36 self.loadButton.isEnabled = true
37 if let error = error {
38 // handleClientError(error)
39 print ("ERROR: Delegate URL session completed with error
!!: \( error)")
40 } else if let receivedData = self.receivedData ,
41 let string = String(data: receivedData , encoding: .utf8)
{
42 self.webView.loadHTMLString(string , baseURL: task.
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currentRequest ?.url)
43 }
44 }
45 }
The above code interacts with a UI that consists of a button and a webview.
The idea behind the app is that when the button is pressed the webview loads
www.example.com using HTTPS. Note that this is how iOS implements HTTP also.
However as a result of iOSs app transport security (ATS) update in the release of the
iOS 9 SDK, if the developer tries to access example.com using http, an exception will
be thrown and the app will not run.
Figure 4.9 above shows how the developer should create a URLSession object so
that it uses a delegate instead of the shared singleton URLSession class. The second
snippet of code immediately follows the first on the solution document and shows the
delegate methods that must be implemented in order to make use of a URLSession
delegate.
On first glance, the sheer amount of code needed to implement HTTPS for iOS
was surprising. However the solution page that we identified comes with not only a
complete and secure implementation but it is extremely well explained. Moreover,
the code supplied as the solution is exactly the code necessary to implement HTTPS.
The only decision that a developer would need to make in configuring this API is
which website they would like to interact with. As a result of this simplicity of imple-
mentation the iOS HTTPS security mechanism is identified to be highly abstracted,
and will receive full marks for this category.
Androids implementation for HTTPS is quite simple, and Android illustrates its
simplicity through the below 4 line code snippet located in their HTTPS landing
page:
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As can be seen below, since Android does not use a singleton class or a delegate
to implement HTTPS its implementation is intuitive even to a programmer is not
familiar with such creational design patterns. HTTPS for Android will receive a full
score for abstraction because like iOS the only decision that a developer must make
in implementing the security mechanism is which website to connect to.
Listing 4.11: Opening a URL connection (Java)
1 URL url = new URL("https :// wikipedia.org");
2 URLConnection urlConnection = url.openConnection ();
3 InputStream in = urlConnection.getInputStream ();
4 copyInputStreamToOutputStream(in, System.out);
Both iOS and Android will also receive full marks on minimality for their respec-
tive HTTPS mechanisms. Although on first glance one may argue that iOS has an
oddly large amount of code associated with its implementation, all of that code is
directly associated with the mechanism configuration. Therefore it is out of the scope
of a minimality evaluation and associated with the abstraction evaluation. Plus, del-
egation is a common design pattern in iOS development. To a beginner it can seem
as though this large amount of code for such a simple task adds complexity. But
in reality it allows for very effective fine grained configuration of a given HTTPS
connection.
Interestingly the robustness of the two mechanisms vary. As identified in the
abstraction evaluation, there is only one choice that must be made for both the iOS
and Android implementation. In each the developer must specify the desired URL.
Mistyping the URL to be written with http:// is a potential error that this paper
deems quite plausible. Such a error would render the mechanism useless, but the
underlying systems security will remain in tact. As a result Android receives 1/3 for
robustness as this is a realistic outcome for the Android API. Apple on the other had
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is able to score full marks on HTTPS robustness because of the recent release of App
Transport Security (ATS). This capability was released with the iOS 9 SDK, and can
be thought of more of a review policy for iOS app code as opposed to an update. If
it recognizes that your app is using HTTP instead of HTTPS it will literally throw
an exception at runtime and stop the app from running. As a result the iOS HTTPS
implementation can be considered extremely robust and will receive full marks.
Testing
Both iOSs Xcode and Androids Android Studio provide the developer with quite
robust and useful test suites. Apples Xcode includes a tool called Instruments,[36]
which apple describes as a flexible performance and analysis tool. This tool can be
used not only to test things like memory and energy usage, but also network statistics
and performance. As a result it can be used somewhat effectively to track whether
HTTPS is being used by showing whether or not the traffic is coming from port
443. Although ports can be mapped anywhere, this is a decently effective way of
identifying that the connection is using HTTPS. Since it does not fully assess the
connection though, the iOS addressed score for HTTPS will receive a one out of two
for being partly addressed.
Android has a very similar test suite that can monitor memory, cpu, gpu and
network use. However, Android networking monitor only tracks the utilization of
the an apps network connectivity. It does not contain any diagnostics on which port
or what type of connection each of the connections are. Outside of IDE test suites,
Google actually does provide a quite usable network traffic security testing tool called
nogotofail[37]. Its purpose is literally to test for weak spots in TLS/SSL connections.
However, nogotofail was only discovered as a result of consulting Steins paper. This
testing tool is not readily linked in the Android documentation. As a result, Android
will only receive a half score on its testing being addressed.
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4.2.2 Certificate Pinning
Documentation
Android coverage for certificate pinning is slightly stronger than that of iOS be-
cause its documentation has a page that represents a certificate pinning landing page,
while iOS does not. Therefor Android receives a full score, while iOS will receive two
out of three points.
Table 4.5: iOS and Android Certificate Pinning Coverage
iOS Android
Secure Comms home page X X
Certificate Pinning home page X
Certificate Pinning Solution X X
Library docs X X
Certificate pinning is often considered to be a somewhat advanced security mecha-
nism to be implemented. It requires the developer to understand TLS/SSL communi-
cation, as well as the certificate chain of trust quite well prior to implementation. The
most current iOS implementation still reflects such complexity in its implementation,
as it requires a series of case statements pertaining to complex API calls. Android on
the other hand recently made certificate pinning dead simple in their Android Nougat
release of Network Security configuration. Because of the increased certificate pin-
ning implementation simplicity, Android has made sure to advertise. Upon its release,
Android made a very clear landing page essentially on the Security homepage that
discusses all of the unique things one can now do with the certificate chain of trust.
Apples iOS on the other hand still has its certificate pinning documentation deeply
hidden in its documentation, not even offering a landing page for the mechanism.
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As alluded to previously, certificate pinning was heavily simplified in Androids
Nougat release. As a result they have published comprehensive documentation asso-
ciated with the security mechanism. All pages in the Android pinning document set
are intuitively linked and like their HTTPS documentation, their pinning home page
also contains the full solution for implementing certificate pinning into an Android
app. Because of this Android receives a full score on its structure.
Figure 4.9: iOS Certificate Pinning Documentation Structure
Figure 4.10: Android Certificate Pinning Documentation Structure
In contrast, iOS is far behind Android in terms of their documentation support for
certificate pinning. They are not only missing a landing page for certificate pinning
that will create awareness for the security mechanism, their solution is not even
directly linked to the main network of certificate pinning associated pages. As a
result, Apple receives a score of zero on structure. They are not only missing a
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document from the graph but their solution is also indirectly linked to the other
important documents of the document set.
Androids addition of the network security configuration in Android Nougat was
in direct response to rising popular doubt in OS supported certificates[38]. They
wanted to make it simple for programmers to implement the typically complex custom
certificate settings. And they did just that. Certificate pinning on Android can now
be achieved through declarative entries into an xml file that will link with the projects
AndroidManifest.xml file. The manifest file describes essential information about the
app to the Android build tools, the operating system and Google play. By linking
the network security configuration for certificate pinning to the manifest file, the app
will compile and ship with the defined certificate settings. The full xml file solution
is located on the certificate pinning landing page and can be copy and pasted into an
xml file. All that needs to be changed beyond the copy paste is the hash specified as
the certificate and/or public key, and how the network security settings will link to
the manifest file.
The iOS solution evaluated in this section is found in full in the legacy docu-
mentation database. This solution is secure and correct, and written in objective-C.
However, iOS is docked one point because the complimenting instruction is overly
verbose and uses vocabulary that is poorly previewed. Without a background under-
standing of the related APIs this documentation would be quite difficult to follow.
One final observation of both the iOS and Android solutions that both docu-
mentation sets discuss how to incorporate and existing form of a certificate into the
application. However they do not discuss how to create that form. For example,
the Android solution uses the hash of a public key and the iOS solution uses a DER
encoded certificate. But neither documentation shows how to get that information.
Through consultation of the OWASP certificate pinning documentation[19], it was
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found that the developer must actually use the command line tool openssl to get the
correct information. This is not at all documented in either platform documentation.
As a result both platforms are docked one point for being incomplete. Therefore iOS
receive one out of three points for their solution and Android receive two out of three
points.
Please note that the solution that will be evaluated in the implementation section
is one that was created as a byproduct from reading through the fragmented code
in iOSs newer documentation set and the previously evaluated Objective-C code. As
stated in the implementation section, we planned to present convertible Objective-C
solutions in Swift as an added convenience to the reader. To do this we followed the
objective-C solution as a guide. Then using the URL Loading system documentation,
which was identified as the home for secure communication in iOS documentation, we
identified the needed Swift controls. Through this approach we were able to create a
cleaner Swift implementation very similar to the objective-C code was created.
Implementation
The certificate pinning implementation for iOS relies heavily on being imple-
mented with a URLSession delegate. This is great example as to why the HTTPS
section evaluated the the delegate implementation instead of the shared instance
implementation. In this section we will simply build upon the connection that we
established in the prior HTTPS section. So please refer back to the previous section
to refresh yourself with the HTTPS implementation.
In order to extend the previously identified HTTPS connection to support cer-
tificate pinning one must add one more delegate function and one more field. Both
additions are shown below.
Listing 4.12: Array that contains data for pinned certificates (iOS - Swift)
1 var certificates: [Data] = {
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2 let url = Bundle.main.url(forResource: "example", withExtension:
"cer")!
3 // Note the bang , because we want to crash the program if it
does not load the cert
4 let data = try! Data(contentsOf: url)
5 return [data]
6 }()
First and most importantly the developer must specify an array of data that
contains all of the certificates that they would like to have pinned. One should
make sure to use an array because it is considered best practice to pin multiple
certificates when implementing certificate pinning[19]. An example of why one should
use multiple certificates is that certificates often are only valid over a certain time
period. If a certificate becomes outdated while users have the app downloaded, the
app will cease to connect to the server. As a result a costly rebundle and re ship
would be required simply to update the certificate. By using multiple certificates
one can more effectively cover such a misstep. Once the certificate is loaded into the
array the only remaining step is adding the didrecieve challenge delegate method to
the previously created HTTPS implementation shown below.
Listing 4.13: Delegate function to handle Challenge (iOS - Swift)
1 func urlSession(_ session: URLSession , didReceive challenge:
URLAuthenticationChallenge , completionHandler: @escaping (
URLSession.AuthChallengeDisposition , URLCredential ?) -> Void) {
2 if let trust = challenge.protectionSpace.serverTrust ,
3 SecTrustGetCertificateCount(trust) > 0,
4 let certificate = SecTrustGetCertificateAtIndex(trust ,
0) {
5
6 let data = SecCertificateCopyData(certificate) as
Data
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7 if certificates.contains(data) {
8 completionHandler (. useCredential , URLCredential(
trust: trust))
9 return
10 }
11 }
12 completionHandler (. cancelAuthenticationChallenge , nil)
13 }
The core idea in understanding how iOS handles certificate pinning relates to the
URLAuthenticationChallenge class. Apple defines this class as the challenge from a
server requiring authentication from the client. Depending on the type of challenge
being sent, the client must respond appropriately. In the case of certificate pinning it
gets slightly confusing because the app is not responding to the challenge sent from
the server. The app is making use of the data that comes attached to the challenge
in order to verify that the servers certificate matches the certificate the the app
has pinned in its bundle. This data associated with the certificates is located in what
Apple refers to as the core of the challenge; the protection space. The protection space
is where the developer will find things like the type of authentication being required
from the server, networking info, and most importantly for our purposes, the server
trust object which contains all of the certificate info. In the above listing, 4.13, one
can see that after verifying information about the servers trust, the implementation
directly checks its certificates field to see if it contains the certificate data being sent
by the server (at line 147). If the certificates array contains the same certificate data
that the server sent, we verify the connection by passing the .useCredential to the
received completion handler. If it is discovered that the certificate actually is not in
the pinned set, we cancel the connection by passing .cancelAuthenticationChallenge
to the completion handler.
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As stated in the documentation section, Android has made its implementation of
certificate pinning very simple through its addition of network security configuration
in Android Nougat. Androids goal in implementing network security configuration
was to make it simple to customize network security settings in a safe, declarative, con-
figuration file without modifying any app code. With this implementation an Android
developer can add custom anchor certificates, opt out of clear-text traffic (essentially
same thing as apples ATS), and pin certificates. And this can all be done by simply
adding or editing an xml file called network security config.xml, and then linking it to
the Android manifest.xml file. Listing 4.14 shows how to declare the use of certificate
pinning in the network security config.xml, and listing 4.15 shows how to link the
certificate pinning settings.
Listing 4.14: network security config.xml
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf -8"?>
2 <network -security -config >
3 <domain -config >
4 <domain includeSubdomains="true">example.com</domain >
5 <pin -set expiration="2018 -01 -01">
6 <pin digest="SHA -256">7
HIpactkIAq2Y49orFOOQKurWxmmSFZhBCoQYcRhJ3Y=</pin>
7 <!-- backup pin -->
8 <pin digest="SHA -256">fwza0LRMXouZHRC8Ei +4 PyuldPDcf3UKgO
/04 cDM1oE=</pin>
9 </pin -set>
10 </domain -config >
11 </network -security -config >
Listing 4.15: Linking the Android manifest.xml to the net-
work security config.xml
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf -8"?>
2 <manifest ... >
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3 <application android:networkSecurityConfig="@xml/
network_security_config"
4 ... >
5 ...
6 </application >
7 </manifest >
The Android configuration for certificate pinning is shockingly simple; the only
choice that the developer must make is which digest to put in the xml file. As a
result Android certificate pinning receives full marks on Abstraction. Considering the
complexity of certificate pinning the iOS implementation is decently abstracted. Its
only downfall is that its configuration requires the developer to create the verification
logic. As a result, iOS certificate pinning will be docked 1 point in their level of
abstraction score. Once again however it is worth noting that the lower abstraction
for iOS enables more flexibility for the developer in implementing certificate pinning.
So if the developer is very used to the more complex implementation of iOS, the API
may serve them better.
As discussed in the solution evaluation, both the iOS and Android documentation
neglect discussion of what information should be pinned, as well as how to get it. In
contrast, when OWASP documentation introduces certificate pinning [19], one of
the first things they mention is that there are a number of different ways to pin a
certificate. This makes the implementation a lot more transparent. It was found
through this OWASP documentation one should use the openssl command line tools
to gather such information and add them to the app bundle. Such a task is identified
to be a considerable amount of overhead work with little to no direction from the
respective platforms. As a result both Android and iOS are docked one point on
their minimality and are scored two out of three points.
We evaluate the robustness for Android to be 2 out of 2. Since the solution is
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clearly provided the only error that is likely to occur is if the developer implements
with the incorrect public key hash. However if this occurs the connection will likely
just deny all incoming requests; unless by some miracle a certificate randomly matches
the incorrectly entered value, which is highly unlikely. The biggest issue that could
occur in implementing certificate pinning for iOS is missimplementing the logic in the
challenge handler. This is a likely possibility because some of the verification constants
are ambiguously named. For example the solution we identified online makes use of
the constants kSecTrustResultUnspecified and kSecTrustResultProceed. When both
of these evaluate to true in comparison with the trust object being evaluated, the
connection is supposed to be approved. Since such an error is moderately likely and
could potentially render all connections valid, the iOS implementation receives a zero
in robustness.
Testing
As mentioned in the HTTPS, Google provides the network security testing tool
called Nogotofail[37]. It is meant to be used as a tool to identify weak spots in
TLS/SSL communication. As a result it not only can identify whether HTTPS is
being used, but can also verify that the certificate chain of trust is being appropriately
used. Unfortunately, the tool does not allow the testing of specific certificates. So it is
quite difficult to verify that the pinned certificate is being used. As a result Android
will receive a half score on its certificate pinning being tested. In contrast, iOS does
not provide any testing resources for certificate pinning, so iOS receives a zero on its
certificate pinning testing being addressed.
4.3 Insecure Authentication
While there are many ways that a developer can authenticate their user; most are
not directly supported by the iOS and Android platforms. As a result, this section
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will focus on device credential authentication because it is considered one of the more
secure practices in app development for secure authentication. And because both iOS
and Android take the most responsibility for providing these security mechanisms.
In this sections we will be evaluating how usable the APIs are for both passode and
biometric authentication.
4.3.1 Device Credential Authentication
Documentation
Apples iOS provides a document that satisfiably represents each of the documents
in the document set. Therefore iOS achieves a full score on their coverage. Android on
the other hand is missing a page that could represent that of a secure authentication
landing page.
Table 4.6: iOS and Android Device Authentication Coverage
iOS Android
Secure Authentication home page X
Device Authentication home page X X
Device Authentication Solution X X
Library docs X X
Something that will stand out about the structure of the iOS documentation
shown below is that the the vulnerability page associated with secure authentication
is disconnected from the remainder of the documents in the document set. As a result
iOS is docked a point and receives a 2 out of 3 on its documentation structure.
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Figure 4.11: iOS Device Authentication Documentation Structure
Figure 4.12: Android Device Authentication Documentation Structure
One more thing to note is that the iOS structure takes on an odd formation in
that the security mechanism homepage is directly linked to the programming home
page but not the security home page. This is a bit of a red flag because the iOS
programming homepage is difficult to navigate unless you know exactly what you
are looking for. Therefore, unless the programmer is specifically looking for local
authentication documentation, the iOS documentation will not create any awareness
for its importance to the developer. This however is not enough to bump the structure
down any further.
The Android structure will receive a 2 out of 3 on its structure even though all
available pages are directly linked. As we stated in the implementation section, a
given security mechanism will lose a point if a page from its document set is missing.
Such a case indicates that the platform is not providing sufficient awareness for the
given security mechanism implementation to the developer. This issue is clearly seen
through the Android documentation since the only way one will find device credential
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authentication is by clicking directly on its security mechanism home page. There is
no page that indicates the need for device credential authentication.
Finally, iOS will receive three out of three points on its solution. The solution is
conveniently embedded in the device credential home page that we identified. The
page is up-to-date, in the iOS developer guide, secure, and has complete and clear
instruction associated with it.
The Android solution is of project format so it is indirectly linked to the device
credential authentication homepage. The actual code in the project is up-to-date and
secure, it also has all necessary instructions in the format of comments throughout
the project. However, one will quickly realize that between both the directions with
the solution and the security mechanism homepage, there are only directions explain-
ing how to implement fingerprint authentication, but no passcode authentication.
Whereas iOS conveniently explained both on the same page. As a result Android
receives a 2 out of 3 on its solutions.
Implementation
The implementation of iOS device credential authentication relies on the localAu-
thentication framework. This framework is what allows for authentication from both
passphrase and biometrics. And conveniently one can implement both with nearly
the exact same code. The below code shows how to implement biometric(both faceId
and fingerprint). As a result we will first explain how to implement with biometrics.
Then once that is done we will explain the changes necessary for implementing with
only passcode.
To implement biometric device credential authentication with Swift, one must
first initialize an LAContext object[39]. The LAContext is the cornerstone of this
implementation because it essentially coordinates the entire authentication process.
If you take a look at the code snippet below, one must first use the LAContext
73
object to verify that all necessary biometric hardware is available. If the hardware
is not available, this evaluation will provide the programmer with useful feedback.
After that, the LAContext object is used in the actual evaluation of the face or
touch id. This is done with the .evaluatePolicy() method where it evaluates the
submitted authentication data based on the authentication policy. After the biometric
data is submitted and evaluated it will pass a boolean referred to as success to the
.evaluatePolicy()s completion handler. If the authentication was successful the success
boolean will have value of true, otherwise it will be false. The code snippet then clearly
identifies where to place the code associated with a successful authentication and a
failed authentication.
One important thing to note with face id, is that in order to use it one is required
to include the NSFaceIDUsageDescription key in the given apps Info.plist file. If that
key is not present, authorization requests will likely fail. This is the only part of
the solution that is not included in the security mechanism homepage. However it is
clearly noted in the LAContext documentation.
Listing 4.16: Biometric and passcode device credential Authentication
(iOS - Swift)
1 let myContext = LAContext ()
2 let myLocalizedReasonString = <..String explaning why app needs
authentication ..>
3
4 var authError: NSError?
5 if #available(iOS 8.0, macOS 10.12.1 , *) {
6 if myContext.canEvaluatePolicy (.
deviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics , error: &authError) {
7 myContext.evaluatePolicy (.
deviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics , localizedReason:
myLocalizedReasonString)
8 { success , evaluateError in
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9 if success {
10 // User authenticated successfully , take appropriate
action
11 } else {
12 // User did not authenticate successfully , look at
error and take appropriate action
13 }
14 }
15 } else {
16 // Could not evaluate policy; look at authError and present
an appropriate message to user
17 }
18 } else {
19 // Fallback on earlier versions
20 }
The process of implementing device credential authentication with passcode is
almost identical to the biometric implementation. The only difference is what we
specify as the LAPolicy argument in the evaluatePolicy() function. In the above
example it can be seen that the .deviceOwnerAuthenticationWithBiometrics case of
the LAPolicy enumeration is specified. That constant indicates that when evaluating
to authenticate the user, the user must be authenticated through biometry. But if we
change the LAPolicy to .deviceOwnerAuthentication, the only other constant in the
enumeration, the authentication will now require passphrase authentication.
The iOS implementation for device credential authentication is overwhelmingly
simple considering the complexity of local authentication. The LAContext object
abstracts away all failed attempts, all UI creation, and all hardware interaction.
And the developer is left with a simple double conditional that clearly lays out the
resulting logic flow. Plus the switch between biometric authentication and passphrase
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authentication is as easy as changing a constant. As a result iOS undoubtedly receives
a full score on abstraction. The implementation is also extremely modular. There is
almost no overhead in its implementation. As a result it will receive a full score on
minimality as well.
As mentioned in the abstraction evaluation, there are almost no decisions that
need to be made by the developer. The only one that stands out is the misspecification
of the LAPolicy constant in the evaluatePolicy method. However, there are only two
options; one for biometric and one for passcode, which will both maintain some level
of security. The only other identifiable error is the misinterpretation of the logic flow
in the evaluatePolicy completion handler. However, the comments included in the
code snippet are directly taken from the iOS solution. As a result I feel that it is quite
unlikely the developer will misinterpret the logic flow. As a result, iOS will receive a
full score on Robustness as well.
Unlike the iOS implementation, the Android implementation for fingerprint au-
thentication and password authentication vary greatly. As a result we will discuss
both implementations and grade the device credential implementation based on the
worst score.
In order to implement fingerprint authentication in Android the developer must
specify permission in the Android manifest.xml file the line identified in figure 4.17.
This is necessary because when an app needs access to certain hardware on a device,
a line like this in the Android manifest.xml is what actually makes the request to use
the given hardware. Without this, none of the code in the project would be able to
make use of the requested hardware.
Listing 4.17: Android Manifest.xml for fingerprint authentication (An-
droid)
1 <uses -permission android:name="android.permission.USE_FINGERPRINT"/>
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Once the developer has given the app access to the fingerprint scanner, she has
two remaining major steps. First the developer must write the appropriate checks to
verify that the fingerprint scanner can be used. These checks are pictured in Figure
??. Second, the developer must create a class that extends the FingerprintMan-
ager.AuthenticationCallback class, and then override its callback methods. This is
seen in figure refFigure 8: Fingerprint Authentication Class (Android - Java).
Listing 4.18: Logic prior to authenticating a fingerprint (Android - Java)
1 protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
2 super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
3 setContentView(R.layout.activity_main);
4 KeyguardManager keyguardManager = (KeyguardManager)
getSystemService(KEYGUARD_SERVICE);
5 FingerprintManager fingerprintManager = (FingerprintManager)
getSystemService(FINGERPRINT_SERVICE);
6
7 TextView errorText = (TextView) findViewById(R.id.error_message)
;
8
9 // Check whether the device has a Fingerprint sensor.
10 if (! fingerprintManager.isHardwareDetected ()) {
11 errorText.setText(getResources ().getString(R.string.
fingerprint_not_exist));
12 } else {
13 // Checks whether fingerprint permission is set on manifest
14 if (ActivityCompat.checkSelfPermission(this , Manifest.
permission.USE_FINGERPRINT) != PackageManager.
PERMISSION_GRANTED) {
15 errorText.setText(getResources ().getString(R.string.
fingerprint_not_enabled));
16 } else {
17 // Check whether at least one fingerprint is registered
77
on your device
18 if (! fingerprintManager.hasEnrolledFingerprints ()) {
19 errorText.setText(getResources ().getString(R.string.
fingerprint_not_registered));
20 } else {
21 // Checks whether lock screen security is enabled or
not
22 if (! keyguardManager.isKeyguardSecure ()) {
23 errorText.setText(getResources ().getString(R.
string.lock_screen_setting_disabled));
24 } else {
25 FingerPrintHandler helper = new
FingerPrintHandler(this , errorText);//Set
Fingerprint Handler class
26 helper.startAuth(fingerprintManager);//now start
authentication process
27 }
28 }
29 }
30 }
31 }
Listing 4.19: Fingerprint Authentication Class (Android - Java)
1 public class FingerPrintHandler extends FingerprintManager.
AuthenticationCallback {
2 private Context context;
3 private TextView errorText;
4
5 public FingerPrintHandler(Context mContext , TextView errorText)
{
6 this.errorText=errorText;
7 context = mContext;
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8 }
9
10 public void startAuth(FingerprintManager manager) {
11 CancellationSignal cancellationSignal = new
CancellationSignal ();
12
13 // check permission of object requesting to authenticate
with fingerprint
14 if (ActivityCompat.checkSelfPermission(context , Manifest.
permission.USE_FINGERPRINT) != PackageManager.
PERMISSION_GRANTED) {
15 return;
16 }
17 manager.authenticate(null , cancellationSignal , 0, this , null
);
18 }
19
20 /* Method will call on Fingerprint Auth Succeeded */
21 @Override
22 public void onAuthenticationSucceeded(FingerprintManager.
AuthenticationResult result) {
23 Log.d("Authentication", "Fingerprint Authentication 
successful.");
24 onAuthSuccess ();
25 }
26
27 /* Method will call on Fingerprint Auth Failed */
28 @Override
29 public void onAuthenticationFailed () {
30 this.update("Fingerprint Authentication failed. Please try 
again.");
31 Log.d("myTag", "Auth failed");
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32 }
33
34 /* Method will call on Fingerprint Auth Error */
35 @Override
36 public void onAuthenticationError(int errMsgId , CharSequence
errString) {
37 this.update("Fingerprint Authentication error\n" + errString
);
38 }
39
40 /* Method will call on Fingerprint Auth have some help */
41 @Override
42 public void onAuthenticationHelp(int helpMsgId , CharSequence
helpString) {
43 this.update("Fingerprint Authentication help\n" + helpString
);
44 }
45
46 /* Trigger this method on FingerPrint get Success */
47 private void onAuthSuccess () {
48 this.update("Fingerprint Authentication Succeeded !!!. App 
use is now disabled");
49 // context.startActivity(new Intent(context , WelcomeActivity.
class));
50 //(( AppCompatActivity) context).finish ();
51 }
52
53 /* Method to update Error text message on Auth failed */
54 public void update(String e) {
55 errorText.setText(e);
56 }
57 }
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By taking a look at figure 4.18, one can see that prior to the actual authentication
of biometric or passcode data, a number of cases must be satisfied using the finger-
printManager object and the keyguardManager object. It must be verified that the
device has a fingerprint scanner, that the app has fingerprint permission, that there
is a fingerprint enrolled on the device, and finally that lock screen security is enabled.
Only once all of those things are verified can an of an authentication be called.
As stated before, unfortunately the fingerprint.authenticationcallback class must
be manually implemented by the developer. Essentially this class handles the outcome
of any fingerprint authentication process. For example it has a callback method
called onAuthenticationSucceeded() which is called when the fingerprint matches one
managed by the fingerprintManager. Likewise, the onAuthenticationFailed() is called
when the fingerprint manager evaluates there to be no existing fingerprint associated
with the submitted one. It is important to note that this code only encompasses the
authentication of a fingerprint. The UI still must be manually created or taken from
the dialog project.
Listing 4.20: Device Credential Authentication with Passcode (Android -
Java)
1 private static final int LOCK_REQUEST_CODE = 221;
2 private static final int SECURITY_SETTING_REQUEST_CODE = 233;
3
4 // method to authenticate app
5 // Keygaurd manager is used to unlock keyboard , and in this case
retrieve intent for password authentication
6 // show password authentication dialog
7 private void authenticateApp () {
8 KeyguardManager keyguardManager = (KeyguardManager)
getSystemService(KEYGUARD_SERVICE);
9
10 if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.LOLLIPOP) {
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11
12 Intent i = keyguardManager.
createConfirmDeviceCredentialIntent(getResources ().
getString(R.string.unlock),
13 getResources ().getString(R.string.confirm_pattern));
14 try {
15 startActivityForResult(i, LOCK_REQUEST_CODE);
16 } catch (Exception e) {
17 Intent intent = new Intent(Settings.
ACTION_SECURITY_SETTINGS);
18 try {
19 startActivityForResult(intent ,
SECURITY_SETTING_REQUEST_CODE);
20 } catch (Exception ex) {
21 textView.setText(getResources ().getString(R.string.
setting_label));
22 }
23 }
24 }
25 }
26
27 @Override
28 protected void onActivityResult(int requestCode , int resultCode ,
Intent data) {
29 super.onActivityResult(requestCode , resultCode , data);
30 switch (requestCode) {
31 case LOCK_REQUEST_CODE:
32 if (resultCode == RESULT_OK) {
33 textView.setText(getResources ().getString(R.string.
unlock_success));
34 } else {
35 textView.setText(getResources ().getString(R.string.
82
unlock_failed));
36 }
37 break;
38 case SECURITY_SETTING_REQUEST_CODE:
39 if (isDeviceSecure ()) {
40 Toast.makeText(this , getResources ().getString(R.
string.device_is_secure), Toast.LENGTH_SHORT).
show();
41 authenticateApp ();
42 } else {
43 textView.setText(getResources ().getString(R.string.
security_device_cancelled));
44 }
45 break;
46 }
47 }
48
49 // method to return whether device has screen lock enabled or not
50 private boolean isDeviceSecure () {
51 KeyguardManager keyguardManager = (KeyguardManager)
getSystemService(KEYGUARD_SERVICE);
52 return Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.JELLY_BEAN
&& keyguardManager.isKeyguardSecure ();
53 }
The Android implementation for passcode authentication requires the developer to
make use of the keygaurd manager to get the .createConfirmDeviceCredentialIntent()
intent. By overriding the onActivityResult() method and then immediately calling its
parent method, the UI for password authentication is taken care of for the developer.
Then the result of the passcode authentication is returned back to the overridden
method and it can be evaluated to see if the password was correct. This is a much
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cleaner implementation compared to the fingerprint scanner because the intent takes
care of the UI for us.
The abstraction of the fingerprint implementation is quite good. The logic of
the outcomes are clearly defined by callback functions, so there are no issue in
mis evaluating authentication outcomes. Android will however lose one point on
its abstraction because of the logic in its passcode authentication intent call. The
LOCK REQUEST CODE and SECURITYSETTINGREQUESTCODEaresomewhatconfusinglynamedconstants.Asaresultthelogicpathherecouldeasilybemisinterpretedup.Asaresult, Androidreceivesscoreof1outof2onabstraction.
Android fingerprint authentication requires the developer to work with a cipher
and generate keys if they want to keep track of when a user adds or changes their
fingerprint. Such logic is actually quite necessary if you want to create a secure app.
Please note such logic was left out in the above code snippets because the purpose
of this section is to evaluate the usability of authentication. However, by taking a
look at the identified Android fingerprint sample project[40] that we identified as the
solution for device credential authentication, one will see how much work must go
into setting up the cryptography tools. Since this overhead is far greater than that
of the actual configuration of the security mechanism, Android will receive a score of
zero on its minimality.
Finally Android will receive a one out of three on its robustness. It was decided
that there are no likely mistaken decisions that would undermine the security of the
mechanism or the underlying security. However the code associated with both the
fingerprint authentication and password authentication is quite verbose. As a result,
if the developer does not fully understand each line of code in its implementation,
a misimplementation is plausible, and could easily have an undermining effect on
the device credential authentication. Through consultation with the robustness risk
matrix, Android thereby receives a one out of three on robustness.
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Testing
Local authentication testing is overall quite trivial for both iOS and Android.
This is because the only real way to test device credential authentication is by man-
ually testing that the implementation is verifying only the correct passphrase and/or
biometric input. This must be done on a real device. But if it verifies correctly on
the real device, the implementation can be considered correct. As a result both iOS
and Android will receive an N/A since there is no real need for them to address much
more on how to test the implementation.
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Chapter 5
DISCUSSION
In the first part of this chapter, we will discuss the overall results of our study.
Following that we identify some thematic issues that the each platform could improve
upon. In the second half of the chapter we will bring the spotlight onto the evaluation
framework used in this paper. In that part of the section we will do two things. We
will compare how our results to Steins results in the previous iteration of this work
and we will discuss limitations and improvements that pertain to the framework used
in this paper.
5.1 Evaluation of Results
Table 5.3 shows a compacted summary of the results of this papers evaluation of iOS
and Android usability. There are two tables, the first is the iOS evaluation and the
second is the Android evaluation. Please feel free to refer back to this table as you
read through the results summary.
Table 5.1: iOS Usability Results
Encryption MAC Key Storage HTTPS Cert Pinning Local Auth
Documentation Coverage 3/3 2/3 3/3 3/3 2/3 3/3
Structure 1/2 0/2 2/2 1/2 0/2 1/2
Solution 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 1/3 3/3
Implementation Abstraction 0/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 1/2 2/2
Minimality 1/2 0/2 1/2 2/2 1/2 2/2
Robustness 0/3 0/3 3/3 3/3 0/3 3/3
Testing Addressed 2/2 1/2 N/A 1/2 0/2 N/A
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Table 5.2: Android Usability Results
Encryption MAC Key Storage HTTPS Cert Pinning Local Auth
Documentation Coverage 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 2/3
Structure 1/2 1/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 1/2
Solution 2/3 2/3 3/3 3/3 2/3 2/3
Implementation Abstraction 1/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 1/2
Minimality 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 1/2 0/2
Robustness 0/3 1/3 3/3 1/3 3/3 1/3
Testing Addressed 0/2 0/2 N/A 1/2 1/2 N/A
5.1.1 Summary of Results
Documentation
The results of this study prove that both iOS and Android put a lot of effort
into creating usable documentation that sufficiently support the average developer in
implementing security mechanisms. However, it is clear that the Android documenta-
tion is consistently okay to perfect scores, while the iOS documentation waivers from
bad to terrible. We point this out because the degree of a platforms documentation
weak spots is perhaps the best representation of their documentation effectiveness.
An okay document set is something a developer can still make use of. A bad document
set is simply useless. If a developer is unable to find an important page because the
documentation structure is terrible, then they have nothing to confirm their thought
process with. Whereas, if the structure is okay- with determination- the developer
will likely discover what they need. Likewise, if the provided solution is terrible and
hard to follow, the developer must create an implementation from scratch or by ref-
erencing a third party. And unfortunately, it is common for developers to copy over
insecure code when consulting third party resources[41]. Whereas, if a developer has
the option to consult an okay, but 100% secure solution provided by the platform,
the likelihood of a secure implementation sky rockets.
The documentation that covered security mechanisms associated with insecure
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data storage was one of the more interesting sections of this papers research. Key
storage for iOS and Android had perfect documentation scores, as both acquired
the highest scores across all documentation evaluations for their respective platform.
However, each platform acquired some of their worst documentation scores for their
cryptographic security mechanisms; encryption and MACs.
It was found that both of the cryptographic security mechanisms had okay to
perfect coverage on both platforms, but their structure seemed to be a consistent
issue. This was a result of the fact that the cryptographic libraries were typically
linked through the respective platforms secondary databases (refer back to section
3.2.1 for reference). Both of these secondary databases consist of an older document
set that has been around since early versions of iOS and Android. As a result they
almost never reference the respective primary databases that typically contain the
most recent and most useful documentation. Because of this, many documents in
this section would not create awareness for other important pages in the set.
Likely the worst characteristic of the iOS cryptographic documentation was the
location of its encryption and MAC solutions. Both solutions were located in a
standalone Xcode project that was mentioned in the encryption homepage, but not
directly linked. The project was referred to as crypto compatibility[29]. The only
reason we were able to discover the CryptoCompatibility project was because we
google searched its title. Worse yet if a developer were trying to implement only
MACs, and not encryption, a solution likely would not have been found. This is
because iOS MAC documentation simply does not mention a solution or even display
a MAC homepage. The only reason the MAC solution was found was because we
evaluated the encryption documentation first and found that cryptocompatability
had solutions for both encryption and MACs.
The Android cryptographic documentation was similarly linked to its secondary
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database; the Javadocs. Javadocs contains the Java Cryptography Architecture
(JCA)[31] documentation, which has been Androids cryptographic framework since
its early versions. As a result encryption and MAC homepages and solutions were lo-
cated on this page. This is a slight downside in the Android documentation because
upon initial investigation this page appears to lack encryption and MAC informa-
tion for Android due to being a large page. It felt that such a characteristic would
cause the average developer to overlook the useful information in the page if they
are unaware that Android simply inherited the Java cryptographic library. However,
if the developer understands this pages relevance, or if they take the time to read
through the table of contents at the top, they will find that there is a quick link
to the encryption and MAC portion of the page that also links to their respective
solutions.
Documentation for secure communication was quite good for both iOS and An-
droid with the exception of iOS certificate pinning. HTTPS is now a commonplace
security mechanism that is almost expected in implementation[42], as result it is no
surprise that both Android and iOS had near perfect scores in this category. However
it was a surprise to see that Android had near perfect documentation on certificate
pinning, while iOS certificate pinning ended up being the platforms worst documen-
tation score. Consequently, the certificate pinning evaluation represented one of the
largest cross platform variations in the documentation evaluation.
The reason for such variation across platform certificate pinning documentation
becomes clear upon the realization of Androids recent addition of the network security
configurations feature[43], which was released with Android Nougat. There have been
numerous concerns in modern communication security in regards to the reliability
of the certificate chain of trust used in SSL/TLS connections[44]. However, in the
past implementing safeguards like certificate pinning to protect against such concerns
has been quite difficult. The Android release of the network security configurations
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feature was a direct response to this traditionally difficult task. The purpose of the
network security configuration feature was to grant the developer control over their
applications network security policy in a safe, declarative configuration file without
modifying code. With its addition developers can now implement certificate pinning,
customize trust anchors, and require encrypted traffic (similar to Apples ATS feature),
all in a robust declarative manner.
Because Androids approach to implementing certificate pinning is so unique, yet
simple, it is no surprise that they have made sure to create awareness for it. As a
result, the Android certificate homepage is conveniently linked directly on the secure
communication homepage. Plus, the Android documentation for certificate pinning
has nearly everything a developer could possibly need to implement it. Apple on
the other hand has a rather complex implementation that they seem to hide from
the developer. It is indirectly linked in its secondary database, and is written in
objective-C.
The evaluation of secure authentication documentation proved to favor iOS over
Android documentation. Surprisingly, device credential authentication is the only
documentation evaluation that actually favored iOS documentation over Android
documentation for a given security mechanism. In this section we evaluated how
well the documentation covered both biometric and password documentation. It
was found that iOS had a simple API that allowed for the use of the same code
to implement both password and biometric implementations. The only variation
between the two implementations was a constant that had to be specified for the
actual evaluation. In contrast, Android had two entirely different implementations
for biometry and passcode. All things considered, we hypothesize that the reason the
iOS documentation turned out to be more effective than Androids was a result of its
APIs simplicity. Apples API was easy to explain for passcode and biometry at the
same time, therefore it was easy to link to and provide information on it. Whereas
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Androids implementation turned out to be quite complex and as a result,difficult to
document effectively.
The documentation evaluation as a whole proved to be a very effective indication
of how complex a given security mechanism would be. And vice versa, the complexity
of the mechanism typically reflected a difficult to use document set. If the mechanism
was recently built up to be easy to use, its information was easily decomposed into
pages that were represented in our document set and were located in their primary
database. Not to mention if the given mechanism was easy to use, the platform wanted
to advertise their documentation on it. Great examples of extremely well-documented
security mechanisms were key storage, HTTPS and iOS local device authentication.
In each of these cases the respective platform had built up these mechanisms to be
very intuitive and usable. As a result documentation was easy to write and there
was incentive to advertise such low risk, high reward mechanisms on the developer
website. In contrast, the cryptographic security mechanisms have not been built upon
for years, they are not intuitive nor easy to use for the average programmer. As a
result, new documentation would be difficult to write, and such documentation would
not reflect well on the respective platform.
Implementation
Our findings for the implementation evaluation of both iOS and Android mirrored
that of the documentation evaluation findings. Such a correlation seems to be a result
of the implementation. This is likely because a well-abstracted, minimal and robust
implementation is often one that is easy to talk about and therefore more likely to
be documented well.
Security mechanisms related to secure data storage followed the above theme and
mirrored the low scores of their documentation. The Key Storage implementation was
perfect for Android, while the iOS implementation was perfect with the exception of
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its minimality. This was because its Objective-C implementation requires some extra
set up in order to pass data to a C API call. Like the documentation evaluation,
cryptographic security mechanisms for both iOS and Android were pretty difficult to
use. However, iOS stood out as awful APIs, while Android cryptographic APIs were
just not that robust.
The iOS cryptographic security mechanisms (encryption and MACs) were both
found in a project called cryptocompatability[29], in the iOS secondary database.
This project was not linked to the other documents in the document set and was
written for Mac OS in Objective-C and C. Please note that this code was purely
the algorithms so they could be used in iOS development. The iOS encryption im-
plementation received the worst score out of all security mechanism implementation
evaluations. Its abstraction received a zero because in order to call the encryption
API the developer has to pass 11 parameters. It received a one out of two for its
minimality since the API required the developer to deal with pointers and memory
allocation in C. And finally, its robustness received a zero because it was decided
that the platforms cannot expect the average developer to be comfortable with C.
As a result, it was determined that the amount of advanced C knowledge required
for the implementation severely threatened the underlying security of the app. Plus,
the encryption API likely would have received a zero on robustness even without the
required C code simply because of the difficulty level of accurately specifying all 11
parameters.
The iOS MAC implementation was similar to the encryption implementation in
regards to its minimality and robustness. The iOS MAC implementation, like the
iOS encryption implementation, required too much C familiarity from the developer.
As a result the minimality and the robustness were both given zeros. Please not
that MAC minimality received a zero while encryption received a half score because
the methodology specifies that the relative difference between overhead work and
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configuration work is compared in calculating a minimality score.
Android MACs and encryption were similar to the iOS implementation in that
they used the original Java Cryptography Architecture[31] like iOS uses their original
commonCrypto library[30]. This is not a huge issue for Android because if a crypto-
graphic library has proven to be secure there is no need to change it. However what
was surprising was that they had not built upon their original libraries to make them
more usable for the average developer. Aside from this point though, the Android
implementation actually scored well compared to iOS. The only issue with it was
that they still exposed a lot of technical detail directly related to the characteristics
of encryption and MACs. As a result both received somewhat low robustness scores.
Like secure communication documentation, secure communication implementa-
tion was, for the most part, well-implemented. The only difficult to use implemen-
tation was the iOS certificate pinning implementation, which again reflected its poor
documentation.
The iOS implementation for HTTPS scored slightly better than Android as a
result of its robustness score. Rendering the Android implementation insecure can
be done through a simple typo in writing the url as an http connection instead of an
https connection. The iOS implementation on the other hand guards against that
exact error by using what Apple refers to as App Transport Security (ATS). With it
enabled, if a developer were try to communicate using http only, Xcode will throw
an exception saying that the connection was insecure stopping the application from
running.
The iOS implementation for certificate pinning evaluated to be quite poor. Its
implementation required the developer to implement their own logic into a delegate
function to handle certificate integrity. As a result it received a half score on its
abstraction and robustness. Android certificate pinning on the other hand was likely
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the most usable implementation of all security mechanisms evaluated in this study; all
because of Androids release of network security configurations[43]. Its release made it
so that the developer can do things like pin a certificate and customize trust anchor
all through xml declaration. The implementation doesnt even require the developer
to write a single line of code. Interestingly, it even allows for a setting that is similar
to Apples ATS feature: through the network security configuration file the developer
can decide to disable all clear text communication.
Finally, the implementation evaluation of device credential authentication found
iOS to be an extremely usable API. A developer could use essentially the exact same
code for passcode, fingerprint and face id authentication. The only difference between
each implementation was the value of a constant specified when the actual evaluation
API method was called. Secondly, the iOS implementation abstracted away all failed
attempts and all of the associated UI; leaving only what to do after the success or
failure of the authentication up to the developer. Android scored poorly because
it had two very different implementations for fingerprint and biometric, and both
were verbose and overly complicated. The fingerprint implementation specifically
had an unnecessarily large amount of overhead work, as a result device credential
authentication received a robustness score of zero.
Testing
Overall testing by both platforms was decently addressed. The only security
mechanism that offered fully useful test resources was the iOS encryption mechanism
because it came with adequate test data. Likewise iOS MAC testing was almost fully
addressed, but it did not offer data that would allow one to test SHA-256, it only
gave test data for SHA-1. The iOS test data for both encryption and MACs were
bundled with their solutions in the Cryptocompatability[29] project. Android did not
offer any testing resources, or even discuss testing in regards to their cryptographic
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security mechanisms.
Testing tools are offered by both iOS and Android to help test secure connections.
However iOSs test suite, Instruments[36], only partly tests HTTPS by checking the
port number of connections. And it cannot be used to check certificate information.
Google does offer a tool called nogotofail[37] that does in fact test both HTTPS
and certificate verification; however this tool was only found through consultation of
Steins thesis. It was never discovered in the exploration of Android documentation.
Finally, testing was deemed not applicable for key storage and device authentica-
tion as their functionality verification is intuitive. As a result both were marked with
N/A on the results sheet.
5.1.2 Platform Usability Improvements
In this section we discuss how both Android and iOS can improve their security
mechanisms to be more usable. The section is split up to discuss platform specific
improvements in documentation, implementation, and testing separately.
Documentation
Apple and Android documentation on average received quite similar good to per-
fect scores on their documentation. However something to note is that iOS received
the two only zero documentation scores for it structure of MAC and certificate pin-
ning documentation. As a result we believe a major priority for Apple should be to
improve the structure of those two document sets. This would mean updating their
documentation to reflect the typical document set that we outlined, or something
comparable. By doing so the mechanisms will not only improve in their information
coverage, but the correct awareness within the documents will also be addressed,
therefore making the information much easier for the developer to navigate. The cur-
rent state of iOS MAC and certificate pinning structure makes it nearly impossible
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for the developer to find the necessary background on either mechanism. As a result
this is a major issue in regards to the iOS documentation.
One common issue between the two platforms is their use of two documentation
databases; their developer guide (primary database) and secondary databases. We
refer to the iOS secondary database as its legacy database[24], and the Android
secondary database is Javadocs[45]. And we suggest that both iOS and Android
update such pages to be located in the developer guide and directly link to other
related pages.
Our evaluation found that Apple still relies quite heavily on their secondary
database. Often times if one tries to google search a given security vulnerability
or mechanism, the legacy database will return. Also a majority of their vulnerability
home pages are in the legacy database. The issue with this is not that the informa-
tion on these pages is too old to use, although for many code snippets their recency
is questionable. The major issue is that the developer guide has duplicate pages that
are often newer versions of these legacy pages and better connected to the other pages
in the document set. While these older pages are not at all linked to any of the new
documentation in the document set. As a result, it is easy for the developer to find
themselves researching in a rabbit hole of somewhat old information in the legacy
database when they could likely find concise, recent, well-structured documentation
in the developer guide.
Androids use of Javadocs is an issue, but a lesser one compared to iOSs use of
their legacy documentation. This is because the only time Androids use of their
secondary database is required in this study is when one tries to implement crypto-
graphic security mechanisms; encryption and MACs. It turns out that a majority
of Android cryptography documentation is found in the original Java Cryptography
Architecture(JCA)[31] documentation. Such documentation is actually quite useful
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and as recent as it needs to be. However, the document itself is far too large, con-
taining a ton of unrelated cryptography information. It is also formatted in a way
that an Android developer would not expect. When we first found the page, we
almost instinctively left it because it was an entirely different format and did not
feel like the right place for the information we were looking for. Because of this we
suggest that Android update the information on the JCA documentation, so that
it is broken up and rewritten in the Android documentation format. This way its
different sections can be directly linked across the Android documentation, which
will then contain only Android specific information. Such structure would make the
cryptography documentation alot more intuitive, and therefore more usable.
Implementation
The iOS cryptography security mechanisms were the most difficult to implement
in this paper. Both implementations have not been built on since the creation of
commonCrypto[30], which handles symmetric asymmetric encryption and hash based
authentication. This abstraction is an Objective-C library that is heavily based on
C API calls to coreCrypto[25], an implementation of low level C cryptographic prim-
itives. As a result the use of commonCrypto turned out to require the developer to
be well versed in C programming. In our implementation it was found that for en-
cryption you not only had to be familiar with C syntax, but also be comfortable with
memory allocation, pointers, and casting. Something that the platform should not
expect the average developer to implement. This not only made the APIs extremely
difficult to configure, but also made them insufficiently robust. Our suggestion to
Apple is to further abstract their commonCrypto library so that pure objective-C or
swift can be used to carry out encryption or the creation of MACs.
The Android cryptographic implementations were not nearly as unstable as the
iOS implementations. The only issue was that they revealed a lot of the cryptographic
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detail to the developer. For example, their encryption implementation required all
developers to choose the algorithm, mode, and padding for their implementation. In
reality this is might actually be very convenient for the experienced programmer.
But for the average programmer, the security mechanism would be more usable if
the implementation were by default secure with no parameters. But then it could
be customized to a different configuration if the developer really knew their stuff. If
this were the case it would be simple to use for a programmer with no encryption
experience. But still offer flexibility for the experienced programmer.
The implementations for for Key Storage and HTTPS were all quite good. Our
only suggestion is that Android may want to imitate iOS in their implementation of
ATS. Adding a tool to their IDE to protect against clear text traffic by default would
be trivial to implement, and would thoroughly improve their HTTPS implementation
robustness.
Certificate pinning and device credential authentication were interesting security
mechanism evaluations because these were the only two implementations that received
polar opposite evaluations across the two platforms. Android certificate pinning is
fantastic as a result of its network security configuration[43] release, while the iOS
implementation is quite poor. And the iOS device credential authentication is phe-
nomenally abstracted to a point where both password and biometric authentication
can be easily implemented in almost the exact same way. While the Android device
credential authentication for passcode and biometric authentication are very different,
and both are difficult to implement. Because of the variation our primary advice to
improve implementation usability for both platforms is to simply take after their com-
petitions implementation. Apple should try to add network security configurations
to its info.plist so that it can imitate Androids network security configuration. And
Android should further abstract its device authentication implementations so that
it is simple to implement both password and biometric authentication in a similar
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manner like iOS.
Testing
Overall testing was not very well addressed. Understandably there was noth-
ing offered for secure authentication or key storage. However cryptographic mecha-
nisms, HTTPS, and certificate pinning should have complete complimentary testing
resources. Apple did a good job with its encryption testing data, but it is clearly out-
dated when it comes to MACs as it only provides SHA-1 test data and not SHA-256.
Android needs to take after iOS and supply test data for both encryption and MACs.
Secondly, both iOS and Android have internal test suites to their developer IDEs.
Apple needs to build upon their Instruments[36] test suite to test for weak spots in the
SSL/TLS protocol as well as some sort of verification system on which certificates are
being used by the apps. Likewise, Google needs to integrate their SSL/TLS testing
suite, nogotofail[37], into Android Studio. This would be a simple way for them to
allow for testing of both HTTPS and the correct use of certificate pinning.
5.2 Comparison to a Past Evaluation
Below you will find the results from Steins paper. We chose to simplify his results
into a similar table to that of ours so that one would be a able to see the primary
similarities and differences between our results and his. One important thing to note
is that we have actually removed four criteria from Steins work in ours. This is
because we found that the methodology for evaluating said fields were not sound
in their conclusions. Also one will notice that Steins framework had structure and
awareness as criteria in the documentation evaluation. Whereas we combined those
two fields into one criteria called structure. As a result in the below evaluation one
will find the average of Steins structure and awareness evaluation. This average is
then directly compared to the Structure score of this paper. Please note that the
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below results are directly comparable with our result presented in section 5.1.
Table 5.3: Stein’s iOS Usability Results
Encryption MAC Key Storage HTTPS Cert Pinning Local Auth
Documentation Coverage 100% 75% 100% 75% 100% 100%
Structure AVG(25,25)=25% AVG(25,25)=25% AVG(100,100)=100%AVG(50,100)=75% AVG(25,0)=13% AVG(75,0)=38%
Solution 75% 75% 100% 100% 75% 100%
Implementation Abstraction 25% 25% 100% 100% 50% 75%
Minimality 0% 0% 50% 100% 75% 100%
Robustness 0% 0% 100% 100% 25% 75%
Testing Addressed 100% 25% N/A 75% 0% N/A
Table 5.4: Stein’s Android Usability Results
Encryption MAC Key Storage HTTPS Cert Pinning Local Auth
Documentation Coverage 100% 100% 100% 75% 100% 50%
Structure AVG(75,50)=63% AVG(100,0)=50% AVG(100,100)=100%AVG(100,100)=100%AVG(100,50)=75% AVG(50,0)=25%
Solution 50% 75% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Implementation Abstraction 50% 50% 75% 100% 75% 75%
Minimality 100% 100% 100% 100% 75% 0%
Robustness 0% 25% 100% 50% 50% 75%
Testing Addressed 0% 0% N/A 25% 50% N/A
In comparing the results one should notice that there are four possible scoring
levels in the evaluation results represented by percentages. Criteria scores were rep-
resented with green at 75-100%, yellow at 50-75%, orange at 25-50%, or red at 0-25%.
Over the entire set of results there were only three scores that varied more than one
scoring level across the two results. The first major variation was the iOS certificate
pinning solution, where our results showed a 33% and Steins results gave a 75%. The
second was iOS MAC abstraction, our results gave a 100% while Steins gave a 25%.
The final major variation was Android Local Authentication Robustness; our evalua-
tion gave a 33% while Steins gave a 75%. Other than these three variations however,
the scores across the two results were quite similar; typically resulting in the same
scores, or at most just one level off.
The documentation evaluation evaluated 3 criteria for 6 mechanisms across iOS
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and Android. So in total 36 documentation criteria evaluations were made. When
comparing our results with Steins there were only 10 deviations across the two sets
of results. And only one result varied more than one level. The implementation
evaluation in our paper evaluated 3 criteria for 6 mechanisms across iOS and Android
as well; evaluating 36 criteria. When comparing these results with Steins there were
just 12 variations, with only 2 deviations greater than two levels. Finally, there were
only three variations across the two sets of testing results for the 12 testing criteria
evaluated.
Overall one can see that the results as a whole scored quite similarly. One will
notice that there is slight variation across the score but this is simply a result of
slightly varied processes for each of the criteria proposed in the two papers. For
example the scoring for the robustness matrix was slightly varied to accommodate
fewer possible scores. Such slight variation in these processes is why there were
variations of greater than one level in Android Local Authentication robustness, and
iOS certificate pinning solution. Such a case occurred for a number of other criteria as
well. Furthermore, security mechanisms have changed since Steins iteration. So there
are also a number of criteria scores that are variations as a result of different input
data as opposed to a result of the lack of effectiveness of the framework. For example
Android certificate pinning has vastly change and as a result there are three variations
across the results there that are simply a result of a new security mechanism. Because
of this, overall we identify that this iteration of the work further verifies that the
usability framework to be quite effective. Although not every single criteria exactly
matches, overall the two frameworks conclude with the similar results. For example,
both frameworks identify that the cryptography libraries for both iOS and Android
are not very usable. While they both agree that HTTPS and and Key Storage APIs
are quite usable. This however does not fully verify the framework. At this point
we have evaluated usability of these mechanism using four different evaluators. In
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order to more fully verify this framework it would be worthwhile to carry out this
evaluation in a survey fashion that would allow for many more people to test our
findings.
5.3 Evaluation of The Framework
The main goal of this paper was to assess how well iOS and Android support the
average developer in the secure implementation of security mechanism. By doing so
we felt that it would reveal insights into which platform better supported the creation
of secure applications. In order to carry out this evaluation we created a framework
that evaluated the documentation, implementation, and testing of a number of the
most used and most important security mechanisms created by iOS and Android.
Our framework was inspired by the usability evaluation framework proposed by Flo-
rian Stein[6], and built upon it through the consultation of the cognitive dimensions
framework[11]. In this section we will evaluate the perceived effectiveness of the
framework that was proposed in this paper. And where applicable, we will compare
similarities and differences between Steins framework and ours.
The evaluation was in its entirety, carried out by hand. Alternatives to a manual
evaluation were heavily researched prior to evaluation, but ultimately no alternative
techniques proved to be effective enough. The only realistic alternative was the use
of surveys with experienced mobile developers as its participants. However this was
ultimately ruled out as a possibility because of time constraints and a lack of both
iOS and Android developers. Another option considered was automated testing.
However this idea was quickly discarded, the evaluations in this paper are in nature
very qualitative, and automation would not be able to adequately capture many of
the important nuances of usability.
A major goal in re-creating the evaluation framework was to improve the documen-
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tation evaluation. We wanted to simplify it to be easy for the reader to understand
and conceptualize. As a result we came up with the concept of a document set.
Through actual evaluation of security mechanisms in the study it was realized that
there were about five types of pages that every well- documented security mechanism
had. We identified these five pages as our document set. The document set was a
very important improvement to our documentation evaluation because it allowed us
to quantify how well the respective platform covered all necessary information asso-
ciated with the security mechanism. Secondly, with the document set, we now had a
universal way to map the connections between the information associated with each
security mechanism. As a result our structure criteria uniquely used a graph to rep-
resent two of Steins criteria: structure and awareness. It was felt that by presenting
the document set in the form a graph the reader was able to intuitively understand
the layout of the platform provided information. This technique also allowed for a
more quantitative way of grading the structure and awareness that the documentation
provided.
Our implementation evaluation was somewhat inherited from Steins framework
proposal. The only difference was that we discarded one of his criterion because
it turned out to be overly difficult to measure. The abstraction and minimality
criteria allowed us to split the implementation into two workloads which made the
usability evaluation quite intuitive. It was identified that the work done to implement
a security mechanism could be broken up into one of two categories: (1)work directly
associated with the configuration of the mechanism, and (2)work that was unrelated
to the mechanism but necessary for its incorporation into a project. Using the criteria
abstraction and minimality we were able to satisfiably measure both in a quantifiable
way. Finally we measured how a error could affect a given security mechanism with
the robustness score. The validity of this evaluation is still questionable because it
relies on the assumption that the evaluator can identify all possible errors. However,
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it was ultimately kept because it does offer a useful perspective on how each of the
security mechanisms function. The technique of evaluating robustness though can no
doubt be improved upon.
Limitations
One major limitation of the framework is its inherent subjectiveness. Because the
entire evaluation is, for the most part, carried out through manual evaluation, the
evaluators previous knowledge brings unavoidable evaluation bias. As an experienced
programmer there were likely many confusing subtleties that were skimmed over as
a result of comfort with the two platforms. If this paper could be evaluated through
a survey a more objective set of results could be drawn.
Another limitation of this paper that was highlighted was the inclusion of the pri-
mary and secondary databases for iOS. Apple has what this paper refers to as a legacy
database that a lot of its vital documentation are located in. These documents are in-
formative, but often verbose and completely separate of their newer more informative
developer guide. Often times throughout the evaluation these legacy documents took
us down a rabbit hole of information that was not useful for actual implementation.
While the developer guide provided concise well linked explanations for many of the
security mechanism. As a result the use of legacy documents in a future work should
affect the score of the platforms documentation scores in some way.
Also, the implementation evaluation is one that can always be improved upon.
Overall we still approve of our implementation evaluation because the usability of a
security mechanism is simply difficult to measure. And it is felt that our approach ef-
fectively decomposed each implementation into very useful criteria. But, if this study
is carried out again, we would suggest further consulting the cognitive dimensions
framework[11] to improve upon it. A majority of our time was spent improving on
the documentation section in consultation with Greenes approach. The next natural
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step in improving the framework would be to do the same for the implementation
evaluation.
Finally, a major assumption of this paper is that it assumes the correct imple-
mentation for all security mechanisms by the respective platforms. The goal of this
paper is the evaluation of each security mechanisms usability. Although this paper
does test the basic functionality of each mechanism at the end of the study. Such
testing is not enough to confirm that each implementation is fully functional. As a
result, it is possible that this framework could be used to evaluate insecure security
mechanisms and the difference would not be apparent.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this work is to compare the usability of security mechanisms created
by iOS and Android. By doing this we expected to identify which platform best
supported the average developer in creating secure applications. Thereby reflecting
a very important characteristic of how secure each platform is. In order to evaluate
the usability of security mechanisms we created an evaluation framework inspired
by one created by Stein[6]. It was then built upon in consultation with the cognitive
dimensions framework[11]; Steins original inspiration. We then used this framework to
evaluate seven security mechanism that were identified as some of the most important
and highly used in the OWASP top ten vulnerabilities list??.
It was identified that the number one vulnerability in mobile security according
to OWASP is that developers are misusing security mechanisms and thereby render-
ing their applications insecure??. This fact is the primary inspiration for this paper
because it brings to light an interesting fact. This fact being that the correct im-
plementation of security mechanisms is heavily correlated to the support given by
the respective platforms that built them. This chapter also outlines the main goals
of this paper. (1)To compare the usability of seven of the most important security
mechanisms created by iOS and Android. (2) Provide an evaluation framework that
can be used to evaluate the usability of a given security mechanism. (3) To extend on
the OWASP mission to aid the average developer in secure implementation of mobile
applications.
Currently, the only paper directly related to the usability of security mechanisms
is Steins paper; A Framework for the evaluation of Mobile Platform Support for im-
plementing security Mechanisms[6]. In this section we also discussed past approaches
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in assessing the security of security mechanisms. We also devoted a lot of content
to research of usability. There are numerous ways to assess usability; automation,
surveys, cognitive frameworks. In this section we discussed the benefits and negatives
of each, and ultimately identified that the cognitive dimensions framework was best
suited for the work being carried out in this study.
Once it was decided that our evaluation framework would be one based on the
cognitive dimensions framework, we were able to propose our own evaluation frame-
work specifically meant for evaluating security mechanisms. The security mechanism
chosen for evaluation were taken directly from the OWASP top ten list. It was identi-
fied that the evaluation should be broken up into three main parts in order to reflect
the software development cycle. As a result it was broken up into three sections that
would evaluate the documentation, the implementation and the testing respectively
of each security mechanism. Then within each subsection of the evaluation criteria
we defined criteria that could be quantitatively scored in order to reflect how usable
each evaluated security mechanism is.
Once the security mechanisms and the evaluation framework were identified the
actual evaluation was reported on; the evaluation can be found in chapter 4. This
chapter was broken up into three sections based on the security vulnerability that
each of the security mechanisms defended against. The Insecure Data Storage section,
section 4.1, evaluated the usability of the arbitrary encryption, MAC, and key storage
mechanism. The insecure communication section, section 4.2, evaluated HTTPS and
certificate pinning. And the insecure authentication section, section 4.3, evaluated
device credential authentication.
A summary of our evaluation can be found in chapter 5. In this section we dis-
cussed the strong points of Android and iOS support, as well as their main weak spots.
There were also a number of unexpected findings that were cited in this section. It was
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found that overall both iOS and Android put a lot of effort into making well-designed
security mechanisms with effective documentation and testing tools. However, on
average Android security mechanism documentation and implementations were more
usable.
Android documentation as a whole was comprehensive and well structured for
nearly all security mechanisms evaluated in this study. It was almost entirely located
in their developer guide so all necessary information was easily found and clearly
outlined. iOS did a good job too, but wavered often because it required the reference
to outdated documentation located in its secondary document database (secondary
document database defined in section 3.2.1). A majority of the iOS pages that offered
security vulnerability background were located in this older document set. Because of
this, if a developer was only referencing the developer guide, they would likely not be
made aware of the importance for many of the security mechanisms. Likewise, these
older documents were never linked to the other more recent and useful documents
that are in the developer guide. So developers referencing the older documents would
likely miss out on some of the most useful information needed to implement certain
security mechanisms.
iOS had extremely usable and well-designed implementations for key storage,
HTTPS, and device credential authentication. However, their encryption, MAC and
certificate pinning implementations were very difficult to use. For example, the iOS
cryptography mechanisms (encryption and MACs) require the developer to write in
C and use low level C APIs that should realistically be abstracted upon by now.
Android on the other hand, only had one real weak spot- its device credential au-
thentication. From a different perspective, however, Apple implementations may have
been the more difficult mechanisms to implement. But they offered more flexibility
in their implementation. As a result, some more experienced developers may prefer
to work with iOS despite its lesser usability.
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In the second half of chapter five we re-evaluated the effectiveness of the framework
that this paper proposed. In this section we pointed out a few of the major downfalls
in our proposed usability evaluation framework. The primary limitation that we
identified was the subjective nature of our framework. It was identified that the act
of evaluating usability had to be qualitative since usability is in nature very abstract.
So despite its limitations we still felt our cognitive approach was the only effective
way to evaluate usability. We also identified that the best way to improve upon
this limitation would be to turn this study into a survey in order to compile many
perspectives in the evaluation.
In summary, this study served as a proposal of a usability framework that could
be used to evaluate the usability of mobile security mechanisms. It also made use
of the framework in order to compare the usability of the iOS and Android plat-
forms alike. By carrying out this study we found that on average, Android provided
more usable documentation, and supplied implementations that made it much easier
for the average developer to use. Despite iOSs typical increased complexity, it was
identified that all security mechanisms did have supporting documentation and im-
plementations, they were just more complicated. As a result, in some cases the iOS
implementations may be preferable to more experienced programmers. Finally it was
identified that the framework that we proposed was quite effective in evaluating the
usability of security mechanisms. However, it is not without its weak spots and does
have space for improvement.
6.1 Future Work
There are a number of ways that this study can be built upon in order to improve the
research being done around the usability of mobile security mechanisms. The first
and likely most obvious is another iteration of this work. If one is to carry out another
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iteration of this paper it will further bolster the evaluation framework where similar
results are found. It will also bring to light potential issues with the framework where
there are differences in results. Likewise, the work could be extended to be evaluated
through survey to draw more objective results.
Secondly, the framework could be extended in a number of different ways. For
example, this paper currently only measures the usability of seven security mecha-
nisms supported by iOS and Android. Another iteration of this work could apply
the framework to new security mechanisms,therefore acquiring a more comprehensive
evaluation of the comparison between iOS and Android usability. Likewise, one could
extend this evaluation to another mobile platform. As of right now the evaluation
has only been used to evaluate iOS and Android security mechanisms. But a natural
third platform to evaluate is the Windows platform. Such an evaluation would bring
to light an interesting third perspective in the current mobile security climate.
Another way that this work could be improved upon would be by recreating the
usability evaluation framework. Our implementation was inspired by Steins iteration,
but was greatly simplified in an effort to bring a more clear indication of the respec-
tive platforms usability to the reader. Conversely, someone may want to extend the
framework to be more widespread and evaluate more categories. Such an evaluation
would bring to light some interesting and new results.
Finally, iOS and Android are always coming out with new and improved versions.
As a result, this study will likely only be viable for a few more months. As identified
in the discussion, as platforms release new mechanisms their usability vastly improve.
Because of this, it would be interesting to compare future usability of the same mech-
anisms with the scores in this study. Such a study would yield informative results
in terms of which platform is most actively trying to improve the usability of their
security mechanisms.
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Chapter 7
DEFINITIONS
AES - Advanced Encryption Standard
API - Application Programming Interface
ATS - App Transport Security
AWS - Amazon Web Services
BSI - Federal Office for Information Security
CA - Certificate Authority
CAVP - Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC - Cipher Block Chaining
DSA - Digital Signature Algorithm
ECB - Electronic Code Book
FBE - File-based Encryption
FDE - Full Disk Encryption
GCM - Galois/Counter Mode
HMAC - Hash-based Message Authentication Code
HTTPS - Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IDE - Integrated Development Environment
IV - Initialization Vector
JCA - Java Cryptography Architecture
MACs - Message Authentication Codes
MITM - Man-in-the-Middle
NIST - National Institute of Standards and Technology
OAEP - Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding
OS - Operating System
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OWASP - Open Web Application Security Project
PRNG - Pseudorandom Number Generator
PKI - Public Key Infrastructure
RCE - Remote Code Execution
RNG - Random Number Generation
SHA - Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH - Secure Shell
SSL - Secure Sockets Layer
TLS - Transport Layer Security
UI - User Interface
UID - Unique Identifier
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